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INTRODUCTION
According to Herodotus, the Athenian admiral Themistocles gave remarks to the
Greek forces after their victory over the Persian navy at the battle of Salamis, a speech in
which he makes the following claims tinged with moral judgment of his enemies:
“It was not we who achieved these things, but rather the gods and the
heroes, who resented that one man – unholy and arrogant – should rule both
Asia and Europe too.”
τάδε γὰρ οὐκ ἡμεῖς κατεργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ
ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆσ τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι
ἐόντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον (8.109.3) 1
This is a project about the moral themes expressed in Themistocles’ speech and throughout
the Histories as a whole. In particular, it is a project about the significance of limits – both
those of the physical kind, such as the Hellespont which king Xerxes bridges in his quest
to bring Europe under Persian domination, but also those of the intangible kind, such as
the countless features of the world which in some way or another prevent humans from
acting upon their desires with impunity. By exploring the pattern of the rise and fall of
various rulers, I ultimately hope to demonstrate that Herodotus presents a remarkably
consistent narrative in which those who arrogantly refuse to acknowledge or abide by the
factors which ought to restrain their ambitions often “end badly,” to use a phrase we shall
see repeatedly during the course of this thesis. At the same time, however, this is balanced
against an emphasis on unpredictability and the vicissitudes of fortune. Together, these
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Throughout this thesis, all translations of Herodotus are my own unless noted otherwise.
In the case of a small number of lengthier passages where readability and clarity seemed
more important than grammatical exactness, I have borrowed from Aubrey de Sélincourt
in the Penguin edition; these are marked as “trans. A. de S.” The Greek text has always
been taken from Godley in the Loeb edition.
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ideas form the core of Herodotus’ worldview and inform his method of presenting
catastrophic events as retrospectively explicable in light of a historical actor’s excessive
pride or overconfidence.
Before continuing to outline the course which I shall follow in this thesis, it is
worthwhile to briefly discuss the way in which this project developed and to introduce a
few important themes in the scholarship on Herodotus which have informed my analysis.
This project began with the intent of exploring the moral implications of physical
boundaries within the Histories – that is, my argument would have been quite narrowly
concerned with attempting to prove that the crossing of a geographic feature constitutes a
form of transgression against nature and, by extension, against the will of the gods. On this
view, events such as the fording of the river Halys by Croesus (1.75) or the bridging of the
Hellespont by Xerxes (7.34-6) are significant in their own right and can even be seen as
the reason for leaders’ military downfalls. Although I still consider this perspective to be
partially true even now, the main subject of this thesis has expanded greatly from that
original premise, with the physical transgression now being seen more as a symbol for a
historical figure’s “unholy and arrogant” mindset, to use Themistocles’ characterization.
In large part, this shift in focus was the product of my research and reading of the
scholarship and especially of recognizing that this theme of boundary crossings has been
known for some time.2
To this end, I shall quickly summarize some of the principal sources in the
secondary literature which I have consulted and the important ideas upon which I have
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Cf. Immerwahr (1966) index s.v. “river motif” for a cataloguing of moments when a river
crossing comes before a setback in the Histories.
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drawn in the course of my argument; this is done with the intent to provide the reader with
a clearer understanding of how this thesis is situated within the broader discussion on this
topic. Three important and wide-ranging studies of Herodotus’ work, his outlook, and his
methods of explanation are cited very frequently throughout this project: Immerwahr
provides the classic analysis on the significance of patterning and repetition in the
Histories, though he largely shuns moralistic interpretations in favor of a somewhat
mechanistic view of events;3 Lateiner, writing some twenty years later, moves away from
a rigid “world order” but remains more interested in showing that Herodotus was a serious
historian with rational methods of explanation than in any sort of didacticism;4 lastly,
Pelling’s recent book has provided a number of essential ideas which I have adapted and
employed repeatedly in this thesis, including the notion that events in Herodotus’ work are
“explicable but not predictable” and the notion of the “krisis moment” – a term taken from
ancient medical writings which symbolizes the the point of no return, the point at which
success or failure becomes clear.5 Aside from these general analyses, my perception has
also been influenced by scholars who emphasize the importance of unpredictability in the
Histories, including the problems of limited human knowledge.6 This is by no means a
thorough accounting of my research, and my aim here is not to provide anything akin to a
literature review; rather, my goal is simply to be open and forward about the fact that many
interpretive devices which appear throughout this thesis – though certainly not my specific
conclusions – are built upon the work of previous scholars. So, having laid out something
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Immerwahr (1966).
Lateiner (1989).
5
Pelling (2019); for an analysis of Herodotus’ similarities to ancient medical writers, cf.
also Thomas (1997) and (2006).
6
Within this category would be, inter alia, articles by Kindt (2006) or Shapiro (1996).
4
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of my methodology, it at last becomes possible to discuss how I intend to make the claim
that Herodotus’ work is centered around the dangers of excessive human ambition.
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five named chapters and a conclusion.
In the five primary chapters, I generally follow the course of Herodotus’ work itself; that
is, each of these chapters is dedicated to considering the reign of a specific king – Croesus,
Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes – and to demonstrating the ways in which he exhibits
arrogance or a misguided conception of his place in the world. The first three of these
chapters introduce particular forms of human limitation: Croesus reflects the fragility of
human knowledge and understanding; Cyrus the problems with greed and inflated selfworth; and Cambyses the necessity of obeying and respecting customary behavior. Chapter
Four then addresses the fact that king Darius poses an issue to a simplistic or mechanistic
pattern of rise and fall, given his lack of a violent death or catastrophic military disaster,
thus setting up a clear contrast with Chapter Five and king Xerxes – a figure whom I depict
as the central antagonist of the Histories who simultaneously displays all of the flaws found
in previous rulers. Lastly, a short concluding chapter draws upon the final downfall of
Xerxes as the basis for discerning Herodotus’ general lesson about the world and human
nature and for understanding the relevance of this message even in a modern context where
we do not fear that our hubris will invite divine retribution.
Ultimately, I do not attempt to claim that Herodotus moralizes in the sense of
making prescriptive claims about the proper course of action for one to follow under any
given circumstances, nor do I suggest that the Histories be read as some kind of ethical
treatise. Indeed, even supplying a precise definition for what constitutes moralistic
commentary is not an entirely simple matter, particularly since the author himself does not

5
have a single word or phrase for this concept. While we could of course focus upon his
description of certain actions or events as “just” (δίκαιος) or “necessary” (χρῆ/δεῖ), doing
so would overlook the extent to which Herodotus’ values and perceptions about the nature
of the world and human life are embedded within the narrative of the text. Such a view has
been argued very compellingly by Hau, who concludes that “the Histories is not a
handbook … it shows how the world works (according to Herodotus) and tries to endow
its reader with the mind-set necessary in order to cope with it.”7 With this perspective in
mind, I shall hope to make it clear that in the process of presenting his “display of research”
(1.proem: ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις) and recounting the “great and marvelous deeds” (1.proem:
ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) of the past, Herodotus offers insights into his perspective
of how and why the world operates as it does, insights which take the form of repeated
symbols and general principles about human fate. By exploring these patterns and ideas,
teasing out nuances and attempting to resolve contradictions, it is possible to arrive at a
sense of the messages which Herodotus seems to want his reader to take away from the
work: that the events of history prove the instability of fortune; that it is not always fully
possible to understand the powers at play in the world and that predicting the future is a
hopeless endeavor; that arrogance, greed, and injustice often go hand-in-hand with disaster;
and that the wise man will realize all of these things, reflect on his relative weakness in the
broad scheme of history, and thus keep his ambitions in check.

7

Hau (2016) p. 193; for a general overview of the methods by which Herodotus conveys
moralistic themes, cf. pp. 174-83.
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CROESUS: THE LIMIT OF WHAT IS HUMANLY KNOWABLE
INTRODUCTION

After the proem introducing himself and the purpose of his work, followed by the
stories of the tit-for-tat kidnappings of women between Europe and Asia, Herodotus turns
to his account of the Lydian king Croesus, “the one whom I myself know to have first
begun unjust deeds toward the Greeks” (1.5.3: τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα
ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας). Aside from simply being first in the sequence of kings
whose conquests and misfortunes gradually push the Histories toward its climax with the
Persian invasion of Greece, the Croesus logos is significant in that it introduces nearly all
of the major themes which will recur throughout the work. For this reason, scholars have
long seen the Croesus narrative as “programmatic,” either by revealing Herodotus’ own
thoughts or otherwise framing aspects of the work which will be further developed in the
later logoi.8 In fact, from the perspective most pertinent to the current thesis – the moral
worldview underpinning the Histories – the implications of the Croesus story are so clear
that even Immerwahr, often a skeptic of moralizing interpretations, describes it as a
“parable.”9
In this chapter, I analyze the Croesus logos with the goal of identifying certain
forms of limits and limit transgression which are exemplified both within the main
narrative on Croesus himself and in the various digressions. Throughout the following
chapters of this thesis, I shall return to many of these sub-themes, drawing out the ways in
which later cases mirror the examples from the Croesus logos but also the ways in which
8

For a selection of various examples reflecting this interpretation, cf., inter alia,
Immerwahr (1966) pp. 154-61, Lateiner (1989) pp. 38-9, Shapiro (1996), Hau (2016) pp.
181-2.
9
Immerwahr (1966) p. 154.

7
they present individually distinctive elements and questions of interpretation. Above all,
however, I wish to emphasize that the account of Croesus, whose vast wealth and
confidence cannot forestall his eventual fall from powerful ruler to mere servant of the
Persian kings, is emblematic of the Herodotean notion that human knowledge is inherently
imperfect. Moreover, the failure to recognize that some things are simply beyond the realm
of human knowledge – and by extension human control – seems to be at the heart of every
other transgression carried out in the Croesus logos and throughout the Histories; Croesus
serves as the paradigmatic example who demonstrates for us that lack of understanding
breeds the kind of arrogance and impulsiveness which lead one toward unjust greed, failure
to abide by one’s own customs or to tolerate those of others, and even the willingness to
seek to overturn the fundamental structure of the world.

SOLON’S ADVICE AND THE FRAGILITY OF MAN

The account of Croesus and his reign begins in a somewhat peculiar way; having
announced that Croesus was the first to harm the Greeks, Herodotus immediately moves
backward in time to explain the rise of the Mermnad dynasty and how they acquired control
over the Lydian kingdom. This connection leads to the story of Gyges and Candaules (1.813), the first digression of the Histories and a thematically significant section which
introduces the virtues of propriety and obedience to customary traditions.10 This is followed
by brief summaries of the reigns of Croesus’ ancestors (1.14-25), a section which includes
the amusing digression on how the musician Arion rode a dolphin from Tarentum in
southern Italy to Corinth (1.23-4); this story prefigures certain aspects of the Croesus logos’

10

I examine the Gyges/Candaules story in further detail in my discussion of Cyrus below.
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moral argument – namely the unpredictability of fortune – and is thus worth taking a
moment to briefly analyze in detail.
As a beginning point, it should be recognized that the story of Arion and the dolphin
is told at quite some distance from the main narrative which Herodotus has been conveying
up to 1.23; depending upon how one counts them, it requires at least four points of
connection to understand where exactly Arion’s story fits in: (1) Croesus’ ancestor was
Alyattes, (2) Alyattes was waging war against Thrasybulus and the city of Miletus, (3)
Thrasybulus received word about an oracle from Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, (4)
Periander happened to be ruling at the time of Arion’s adventure. While these levels of
separation do not conclusively prove the importance of the anecdote, they do perhaps point
to the unlikelihood that the story has been included simply because it is remarkable (1.23:
θῶμα μέγιστον, cf. 1.proem: ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) though not thematically
relevant.11 The events of the account itself are fairly straightforward, but to summarize
briefly: Arion travels to the Greek colonies in Italy and earns large sums of money; on his
return voyage, the ship’s crew hold him hostage and demand that he jump overboard or
commit suicide; Arion plays a song for the crew and then jumps from the ship, only to be
miraculously saved by a dolphin which ferries him back to Greece, where he eventually
confronts the sailors upon their return.12 From a thematic standpoint, the story of Arion has
been variously interpreted,13 but it certainly seems to involve the condemnation of greed or

11

Cf. Immerwahr (1966) p. 28 on Herodotus’ selectiveness; cf. also Marincola (2006) pp.
28-30 on the importance of so-called “digressions” to the work overall or Thomas (2006)
p. 64 on the way that a “marvel” (θῶμα) often provides insight into some principle of
nature.
12
For a general analysis of the story, including speculation about its authenticity and
versions in later authors, cf. Bowra (1963).
13
Cf. Gray (2001) p. 11 with n. 2 for references to the earlier literature.
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acquisitiveness – a pattern which will recur throughout the Histories14 – and a sense that
divine justice is distributed in mysterious or unexpected ways.15 To this end, the story of
Arion and the dolphin is the first example of a critically important concept which I employ
in approaching Herodotus: namely, the notion that events are “explicable but not
predictable”. As it applies here, this essentially means that neither Arion nor his captors
could have anticipated that a dolphin would miraculously rescue him, but that we are not
at a loss to understand what has happened – or even why it has happened – after the fact. I
shall return to this idea later in the chapter and throughout this thesis as a whole; for the
moment it is sufficient merely to recognize its existence and its applicability to the Arion
narrative.
When Herodotus at last returns to Croesus himself (1.26), we have thus already
been introduced to some of the basic moral ideas which will underpin the remainder of the
logos. The narrative on Croesus begins in medias res; we quickly learn that he dispensed
with all of the cities on the Ionian coast and that “over time, almost all of those living on
this side [i.e., the western side] of the river Halys had been subjugated” (1.28.1: χρόνου
δὲ ἐπιγινομένου καὶ κατεστραμμένων σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ
οἰκημένων). This passage is significant for a number of reasons, not least of which is the
emphasis which Herodotus places on the physical boundary which signals the limit of
Croesus’ kingdom. Throughout the Histories, the idea of dividing up the world is central
to Herodotus’ thought; to name only a few examples: he observes that the Persians believe

14

For instance, cf. the story of Darius opening Nitocris’ grave (1.187), which I discuss as
an example of the overall problem with greed later in this thesis.
15
Cf. Hooker (1989) p. 142, where he explains that the Arion story exemplifies the fact
that “crimes once committed were bound to come to light … even at a remote date and in
an unexpected manner.”
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Asia to be their own dominion but Europe to be entirely separate (1.4), he speculates at
great length on whether Egypt deserves to be considered its own continent (2.15-17), and
the crossing or transgression of geographic features is often symbolic of arrogance or
misunderstanding on the part of the transgressor, as I shall demonstrate repeatedly
throughout this thesis.16 In the immediate term, his conquest of all the lands of Asia Minor
means that Croesus is now restrained in his ambitions; checked in the west by the sea and
in the east by the Halys, he has become as rich and powerful as he might ever reasonably
expect to be (1.29).17 It should be no surprise, therefore, that it is at this moment when
Croesus encounters Solon and is confronted with the first warning of life’s instability and
the folly of placing one’s trust in human knowledge and assumptions.
The category of “wise advisors” or “warners” has been recognized by analysts of
Herodotus for the better portion of a century;18 these characters caution an overzealous
ruler that he is about to tread on dangerous ground – to walk on the purple rugs, if we may
borrow an image from Aeschylus – and urge restraint. Solon, as the first of these figures to
appear in the Histories, picks up and clarifies several of the moralistic threads which the
earlier stories, such as the Gyges/Candaules and Arion digressions, have already brought
to the reader’s attention. The view that Solon’s words are not his own but rather those of
Herodotus has been argued convincingly by Shapiro (among others) and will not be re-
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On this last theme in general, cf. Immerwahr (1966) index s.v. “river motif” for a listing
of relevant passages and Lateiner (1989) pp. 127-35 for the symbolism and significance of
geographic limits within Herodotus’ explanatory worldview. Bosak-Schroeder’s (2020)
chapter provides a counter-argument to the traditional perspective that the violation of
nature should always be taken as a sign of hubris.
17
According to Immerwahr (1966) p. 155, Croesus’ main accomplishment “was the
consolidation of Western Asia.”
18
Lattimore (1939) seems to have been among the first to identify this theme.
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litigated here;19 however, I do wish to emphasize that the affinities between Solon – and
the other “warner” figures, for that matter – and Herodotus may actually be somewhat
deeper than has previously been acknowledged. Specifically, we are told that Solon
claimed to be traveling the world “on the excuse that he was sight-seeing” (1.29.1: κατά
θεωρίης πρόφασιν), something which seems to closely resemble Herodotus’ own
enterprise.20 Much like Solon, the author himself has traveled around the Mediterranean,
learned about past events, and observed the customs of foreign peoples; in doing so, he has
come to a greater sense of how the world operates and presents this knowledge to his
audience in the form of his “display of research” (1.proem: ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις) so that
they too might share his understanding.21 As I have noted in my introduction, Herodotus is
seldom explicit in telling the reader exactly what he thinks about these matters, especially
when moral or religious themes are involved; that is to say, he is not in the business of
offering direct guidance about the proper decision or course of action.22 By contrast, this is
not the case of the “advisor” or “warner” characters, who very often serve the role of
making explicit the same messages which have previously been hinted at through repetition
or other subtler devices. Accordingly, it may be fair to postulate not only that these figures
express views with which the narrator would agree, but in fact that they may be meant to
stand in for Herodotus in the situations where they appear.

19

Shapiro (1996); for an analysis of how the Herodotean character “Solon” compares with
what we know of the historical figure, cf. Chiasson (1986).
20
On Herodotus’ approach to traveling foreign lands, cf. Redfield (1985), who contrasts
θεωρίη with proper “ethnography” in the modern sense. There has been some debate as to
whether or not Herodotus actually visited the places he claims to have seen; for example,
cf. Armayor (1978a) and (1978b).
21
For an expression of a similar view, cf. Pelling (2019) p. 30.
22
Cf. n. 7 above.
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Returning to Solon himself, Shapiro identifies three primary arguments contained
in his speech advising Croesus on the nature of happiness and fortune: (1) that the divine
is “completely jealous” of human success, (2) that prosperity is therefore “extremely
unstable” and life involves many unpleasant things, and (3) that it is important to see if
someone has “ended his life well” before declaring him happy.23 The first two of these
points are relatively standard Herodotean comments about the “mutability of fortune” and
thus do not demand particularly detailed analysis;24 for the moment, I wish to emphasize
Solon’s third message to Croesus: that it is necessary to reserve judgment on something –
in this case, a person’s life – until one has seen how it ends. Before moving into my
discussion, it is worth quoting precisely what Solon says:
“But whoever has the greatest number of the good things I have mentioned,
and keeps them to the end, and dies a peaceful death, that man, Croesus,
deserves in my opinion to be called happy. Look to the end, no matter what
it is you are considering. Often enough God gives a man a glimpse of
happiness, and then utterly ruins him.” (Trans. A. de S.)
ὃς δ᾽ ἂν αὐτων πλεῖστα ἔχων διατελέῃ καὶ ἔπειτα τελευτήσῃ
εὐχαρίστως τὸν βίον, οὗτος παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ τὸ οὔνομα τοῦτο ὦ βασιλεῦ
δίκαιος ἐστὶ φέρεσθαι. σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν
τελευτήν, κῇ ἀποβήσεται: πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς
προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε. (1.32.9)
Now, I have already mentioned in my discussion of the Arion and the dolphin narrative
that events in the Histories tend to follow the model of “explicable but not predictable.”
This is derived from Pelling, who attempts to differentiate historical explanation of the sort

23

Shapiro (1996) pp. 350-1.
For a good general summary on the “mutability of fortune,” cf. Marincola (2006) pp. 501 with notes. Shapiro (1996) herself also provides solid analysis, including references to
similar passages in the Histories: cf. pp. 352-7.
24
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done by Herodotus from strict logic or scientific explanation.25 He uses the helpful analogy
of a soccer match: just because we cannot know ahead of time which team will win or
which players will score goals, this does not mean that we will be unable to explain why
the match turned out the way it did once it is over. It seems to me that Solon – or, that is,
Herodotus speaking through the voice of Solon – is expressing a very similar idea in his
speech to Croesus. At no point in their discussion does he claim to foretell Croesus’ fate,
instead merely rejecting the king’s desire for a premature judgment which would label him
the happiest of all men on account of Lydia’s power and wealth in the moment. Of course,
the audience of the Histories, knowing full well that Croesus will soon be humbled for his
overbearing confidence, may read into this passage a kind of ominous foreshadowing;
however, for the characters Herodotus presents here, the king’s change of fortune lies in
the realm of what is yet to come – that is, in the realm of the unpredictable. By arguing that
“a man is entirely luck” (1.32.4: πᾶν ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος συμφορή) and that one must always
look to the end before drawing conclusions, Solon is in fact disclaiming his ability to know
the future, something which Croesus would be wise to recognize.
The thrust of my claims about the significance of the Solon/Croesus episode are
now hopefully coming into focus. To be clear, I do not argue against Shapiro and others
who emphasize that Solon’s speech reflects a view in which human prosperity is fragile
and unpredictable; rather, I posit that in addition to these ideas, Herodotus is here trying to
reveal – with Solon as his mouthpiece – a point about the weakness of human knowledge.
Because of the fact that life is so unstable and so caught up in the unexpected turns of

25

Cf. Pelling (2019) ch. 3, but esp. pp. 46-55.
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fortune, he suggests that it would be foolish to place too much trust in one’s own
assumptions about the world. This, of course, is precisely what Croesus will go on to do.

HOW CROESUS REJECTS THE LIMITS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

As we might very well have expected, Croesus reacts poorly to Solon’s wisdom;
angered that he was not declared the happiest of all men of account of his enormous wealth,
the king sends away his “warner” (1.33).26 What follows throughout the remainder of the
logos is a series of misfortunes and setbacks, all of which culminate in his decision to
launch an assault against the ascendant Persians based upon a misinterpreted oracle. At
each step along the way, Herodotus demonstrates to the audience exactly what sort of
person Croesus was, priming us to understand the collapse of the Lydian kingdom as a
product of the arrogance which led Croesus to suppose that he could question the
truthfulness of oracles or avert the course of fortune.
Shortly after Solon’s exit, we are told that Croesus was struck with “great
indignation from the divine” (1.34.1: ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη) for being so presumptuous
as to think that he could prematurely be declared the happiest man.27 However, have we
not already said that events in the Histories tend to be “explicable but not predictable”, thus
creating some difficulty when Herodotus treats the king’s fate as seemingly inevitable? To
address this problem, it is important to recall the difference between what we – or even
Herodotus’ contemporary audience, for that matter – might know about the outcome of

26

Pelling (2006) p. 105 makes the excellent observation that the “failure of
communication” in the first extended dialogue of the Histories may itself be programmatic.
27
Note that I tend to accept the view under which Herodotus employs terms such as ὁ θεός
to imply a general sense of divinity which is at play in the world; cf. Munn (2006) for one
expression of this position.
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events, on the one hand, and what the historical actors themselves would have known, on
the other.28 The odd thing about history is that it seems so obvious in retrospect, where
every action leads nicely to its result; this is why there can be so many “armchair generals,”
for example, who claim that they could have done it better. But if we – with the power of
hindsight on our side – are inclined to see a reference to the gods as suggesting that
Herodotus is some kind of determinist, consider that from the position of Herodotus’
historical actors, what could be more unexpected or unpredictable than the intervention of
the gods? Indeed, as Pelling observes, “if you believe in the Greek gods, you also believe
that there is not much there to be relied on.”29 In the case of Croesus, though he did not
attempt to rely upon the gods, he elected to place his trust in something more unreliable
yet: himself.
The downfall of Croesus, unlike that which befalls later kings such as Cyrus, does
not come at a single unexpected moment but rather as several events brought on by various
forms of misunderstanding and overconfidence. The first of these, the death of his son
Atys, I shall discuss only briefly. Herodotus informs us that Croesus had a dream in which
Atys was killed “after being struck with an iron spear” (1.34.2: αἰχμῇ σιδηρέῃ βληθέντα),
prompting him to take every possible precaution to protect his son; later, however, Atys
convinces his father that the dream was mistaken and that it would be perfectly safe if he
were allowed to go on a hunting expedition (1.39-40), where he is accidentally killed by
another member of the hunting party (1.43). Now, I think it fairly clear that Croesus’ dream
is meant to reflect a kind of divine warning or guidance, as other dreams throughout the
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On the importance of the audience and their assumptions, cf. Pelling (2019) pp. 13-21.
Pelling (2019) pp. 161-2. I discuss the role of the divine in much greater detail in later
chapters of this thesis, particular during my analysis of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece.
29
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Histories will attest in later sections of the work.30 By allowing himself to be persuaded by
his son Atys’ entreaties, the king is essentially discarding divine knowledge or insight in
favor of a human interpretation. Though this perhaps does not rise to the level of Croesus’
later transgressions, he nonetheless suffers greatly (1.46); moreover, this episode sets the
stage by revealing to the reader that Croesus is someone who does not acknowledge the
failures of human knowledge and is willing to ignore signals from the divine.
In the remainder of the logos, these tendencies bring Croesus into a kind of
competition against the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, a move which represents outright hubris
toward the god and a broader failure to recognize the limits between the mortal and the
divine.31 The events leading up to his actual downfall, which I shall discuss in the final
section of this chapter, unfold in two main phases: first, having conceived a desire to attack
the Persians as a kind of pre-emptive strike to prevent them growing any stronger, Croesus
performs an experiment to determine which oracle can offer him the best predictions;
second, he consults the oracle at Delphi – the “winner” of his earlier test – about his
proposed invasion but fails to properly interpret the priestess’ response because of his
arrogance. Croesus’ test of the oracles, though certainly somewhat bizarre – he sends
messengers to several oracular sites with orders to ask what he will be doing on the
hundredth day after their departure (1.47) – may not be inherently problematic; in fact,
Herodotus often seems to align himself with kings who conduct research (ἱστορίη) to
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understand aspects of the world.32 According to this view, the trouble for Croesus is not so
much that he attempts to gain information concerning oracles, since Herodotus does not
explicitly condemn him for this, but rather that his arrogance prevents him from acting
modestly with the information he has received; Christ believes that Croesus “precipitates
his downfall by failing to be equally rational in assessing Delphi’s ambiguous responses.”33
However, as I shall attempt to explain, this position may perhaps overlook an important
aspect of what it means for Herodotus to demonstrate that a character should be seen as
hubristic.
Up to this point, I have mentioned several times that Herodotus seems to be
interested in showing what kind of person Croesus was; in doing so, he essentially builds
the case for hubris by adding one layer of evidence on top of another such that the audience
will be inclined to draw connections between the king’s character and his ultimate downfall
– for example, it has been said that the Histories demand an “active reader” who is able to
follow the narrator’s cues and is willing to be convinced of their meaning.34 A very
compelling article by Cairns may help to clarify what exactly Herodotus hopes to achieve
by creating portraits of arrogant rulers and historical figures; in his study, Cairns considers
whether hubris should be taken to represent particular categories of actions or instead
merely a general attitude, concluding that it is the latter and arguing that “to be [ὑβριστής]
is not just to possess a drive, tendency, or intention to commit hubristic acts, but to entertain
a misguided and inflated conception of oneself and one’s place in the world.”35 This idea
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will be critically important throughout the remainder of this thesis, particularly insofar as
I posit that physical transgressions are symbolic of a problematic mindset; for the moment,
I wish to consider how it might be applied to the remainder of the Croesus logos.
Returning to the test of the oracles, we may now see that even if Apollo was not
directly angered by Croesus’ actions (1.91), the underlying premise behind his experiment
was flawed by assuming that Croesus – or any human, for that matter – has adequate
knowledge of the world to outwit the god and his oracle. Kindt, for example, makes the
useful point that the priestess’ response quoted by Herodotus affirms the gap between
human and divine knowledge by emphasizing that the god “[knows] the number of grains
of sand and the size of the sea, and can understand the dumb and hear the mute” (1.47.3:
οἶδα δ᾽ ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ᾽ ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης, καὶ κωροῦ συνίημι, καὶ οὐ
φωνεῦντος ἀκούω), tasks which are much beyond the ability of even the wisest man.36
Croesus, however, seems to ignore this aspect of the oracle’s response; instead, pleased
that Delphi gave the correct answer to his quiz, he forges ahead without realizing that he is
once again testing the boundary between human and divine knowledge. Thus we arrive at
Croesus’ most famous encounter with the oracle and with the limits of mortal
understanding: its pronouncement that “if he were to lead an army against the Persians, he
will destroy a great empire” (1.53.3: ἢν στρατεύηται ἐπὶ Πέρσας, μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν
καταλύσειν). Here, as in the earlier incident with the dream about his son, Croesus
proceeds to accept a human interpretation rather than trying to make sense of the divine
information which has been relayed to him; however, the interpretation in this case is his
own, as he does not need to be convinced that the prophecy refers to the Persian empire.
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To view it another way, Croesus has taken the “proof” of Delphi’s success in the
experiment as a sign that “oracles are always straight, in the sense that they mean what he,
Croesus, wants them to mean.”37 This is the heart of his hubris, for the king has moved
beyond merely misunderstanding divine messages to imposing his preferred meanings
upon oracular responses, the clearest indication yet of his arrogant and overbearing
character. Of course, when it comes time for Croesus to put his plans into action, he is
humbled and forced to recognize the limits of mortal knowledge and interpretation.

CROESUS’ KRISIS MOMENT: HIS ATTACK ON CYRUS

I have already hinted in the introductory chapter of this thesis at the fact that
Herodotus shares certain aspects of his explanatory style with ancient scientists and
doctors;38 one notable manifestation of this can be seen in the so-called “krisis moments.”
For the Hippocratic writers, the krisis moment refers essentially to the period in the course
of a disease where the treatment will either succeed or fail – that is, where the patient will
either die or recover from his ailments. In his discussion of how a similar idea may be
found in Herodotus, Pelling notes that key sections in battle narratives represent a kind of
turning point where it is obvious that the momentum has fully shifted in favor of one side
or the other;39 however, I wish to draw upon this concept and apply it more more generally
to the “moments of no return,” so to speak, at which hubristic rulers ought to pause and
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reflect upon the scope of their ambitions, but instead go a step too far in their willingness
to trample upon the factors which restrain human activity. In every case, these moments
are signaled by acts of physical aggression, usually across a geographic border,40 which
reinforce the previous indications of arrogance by clarifying them into a single memorable
occurrence; though I am not so willing as Lateiner to accept the mechanistic view that these
transgressions are “a cause, necessary and sometimes sufficient, of historically significant
events,”41 they certainly symbolize the beginning of the end for each hubristic king.
For Croesus, his moment of krisis comes at the crossing of the river Halys, a
boundary whose significance I have already discussed above as a representation of how far
his power and influence might reasonably extend. Having placed human knowledge on a
level equal to or even above that of the divine by bending the pronouncements of Apollo
to his own wishes and desires, Croesus marches his army across by the pre-existing bridge
(1.75) and launches an ill-fated attack against the Persian empire. To him, the outcome of
this war – the destruction of the Lydian kingdom and his enslavement as an advisor to
Cyrus – is entirely unpredictable and contrary to his grandiose expectations; for Herodotus
and the audience, however, it is perfectly explicable in retrospect and becomes the first
example for the broader moral argument that one must acknowledge the fundamental
reality that mortal actions are limited and that we ought to think and behave in light of this
fact. As for Croesus himself, who is saved from death under circumstances so strange and
coincidental that they practically cry out for divine explanation, I shall discuss in the next
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Cf. n. 16 above.
Lateiner (1989) p. 130.
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chapter whether his ordeal has permitted him access to the kind of insights he was
previously so foolish as to question or deny.

22
CYRUS: THE LIMIT ON UNJUST GREED AND AGGRESSION
INTRODUCTION

The man who enslaved Croesus and brought an end to the Lydian kingdom was
Cyrus, the renowned founder of the Persian empire and the figure to whom our narrator’s
attention shifts next. In doing so, Herodotus is returning to what is ostensibly the main
“historical” (in the modern sense of the term) focus of the entire work – that is, the war
between the Greeks and the barbarians and “the reason for which they fought against one
another” (1.proem: δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι). Why the Histories should have
begun with Croesus and not with Cyrus, aside from the important thematic patterns which
are introduced in the Croesus logos, is made intelligible when we consider this broader
context, since Herodotus may be seen as prioritizing Asia Minor – that is, the portion of
Asia closest to the Greeks – and then returning to the gradual rise of Persia and the growing
threat it poses to Greece.42 However, there is also something to be said of the way in which
the narrative on Cyrus himself takes shape; much like the account of Croesus, the logos
begins by jumping back in time to set the stage for the events which are Herodotus’ real
interest. In this case, we learn that Upper Asia had been under the control of the Assyrians
for five hundred and twenty years before falling into the hands of the Medes (1.95), who
themselves ruled – except for a brief interruption brought about by the Scythians (1.103-6)
– until being overthrown by Cyrus. Beyond simply providing context for the reader, this
historical digression is significant for the reason that it amplifies the achievements of the
Persians by emphasizing their status as the final nation in a “succession of world empires”
who had controlled the Near East.43 In this way, by the time that Herodotus has brought his
42
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This idea is the primary topic of Alonso-Nuñez (1988).

23
audience to the account of Cyrus’ reign, we have already been indirectly previewed for the
magnitude of his success.
From a thematic standpoint, the narrative of Cyrus’ rise to power and his ultimate
defeat repeats and reinforces many of the same concepts already introduced in the Croesus
logos. Once again, misunderstandings and lack of foresight demonstrate that human
knowledge is imperfect and that the inability to comprehend the nature of the world leads
to overconfidence and hubris; as before, this plays into the notion that events which could
never have been predicted by the historical agents are perfectly explicable when the full
picture is visible in retrospect. However, it is not at all as if Herodotus has merely copied
the story of Croesus and made the necessary adjustments to repurpose it as the Cyrus logos.
These leaders are clearly identifiable as distinct figures with their own virtues and failings,
fitting nicely into the pattern observed by Marincola that Herodotean characterization is
centered around the “individual yet recognizably universal qualities that form people.”44
Accordingly, it should be no surprise that their logoi take somewhat different approaches
to emphasizing the same basic principles. In particular, I wish to highlight in this chapter
that Cyrus’ success and sudden demise can best be understood as a reflection of the limits
which exist on unchecked greed or aggression; central to this theme is the value of
possession as expressed through the idea of what is one’s own.

“LOOK AFTER YOUR OWN THINGS”: A RECURRING THEME OF THE HISTORIES

To shed light on why Herodotus presents acquisitiveness and aggression as
problematic behaviors – the kind which reflect an unwillingness to acknowledge and abide

44

Marincola (2006) p. 44.

24
by the factors which ought to restrain one’s actions – it is necessary to return to the account
of Gyges and Candaules which was skipped over in my treatment of the Croesus logos. To
very briefly summarize the events of this story: we learn that the Lydian king Candaules
was madly in love with his own wife and he wished for others to witness her beauty (1.8);
the king thus hatches a plot for Gyges, a loyal advisor, to see his wife naked (1.8-9); Gyges
protests but the plan goes ahead regardless, leading him to be detected and given the choice
to either die himself or overthrow Candaules and seize the throne (1.10-12). From a purely
narrative standpoint, the importance of this episode is to explain how the Lydian kingship
passed into the hands of Croesus’ family; however, the passage also has an important
element of moralistic commentary which will be echoed in advice given to Cyrus later in
the logos and may help to explain his demise. The relevant section, a portion of Gyges’
response to the king’s offer, is worth quoting directly:
“Those things which are right were discovered long ago by mankind, and it
is necessary to learn from them. Among them was this: that one must look
after whatever things are one’s own. I myself am persuaded that that she
[i.e., the king’s wife] is the most beautiful of all women, and I ask that you
do not make me do uncustomary things.”
πάλαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι ἐξεύρηται, ἐκ τῶν μανθάνειν δεῖ: ἐν
τοῖσι ἓν τόδε ἐστί, σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ. ἐγὼ δὲ πείθομαι ἐκείνην
εἶναι πασέων γυναικῶν καλλίστην, καὶ σέο δέομαι μὴ δέεσθαι
ἀνόμων. (1.8.4)
For the moment, I wish to focus attention on the idea that “one must look after whatever
things are one’s own.” I have interpreted this phrase very literally, taking the verb σκοπέω
with its most basic meaning of “look at” or “examine;” other translators of the Histories
tend to render σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ with the metaphorical meaning “mind your own
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business.”45 Although there is certainly nothing incorrect about this more common
translation, and although it does seem to capture something of the broader connotations
about knowing one’s proper place in the world, I cannot help but feel as if something is
lost by moving away from the literal meaning – specifically, the sense of physical
proximity that “looking” entails.46 Given what we have already seen of the krisis moments
and physical transgressions being thematically important symbols of an underlying
mindset, I shall continue referring to the phrase as “look after your own things” throughout
the remainder of this thesis. Having explained this, I now move on to discuss what exactly
this concept means and to briefly survey its moralistic implications.
As we saw previously in the example of Solon and his speech to Croesus, moments
in which rulers are given some sort of warning before committing a violation can often be
seen as programmatic, reflecting views shared by Herodotus himself. The same principle
is at play in the Gyges/Candaules incident; moreover, given that this is the first event
described in any detail in the Histories, it may in fact be seen as especially important for
setting out ideas which will guide the entire work. With this in mind, I suggest that the idea
of “looking after your own things” might be interpreted as a kind of metaphor for the
overarching moralistic idea which I have already identified as a central fixture of
Herodotus’ thought – namely, the belief that one must realize that human success is not
unlimited and must temper one’s actions accordingly, knowing that those lacking this
understanding have often come to bad ends. The logic here is simple: in order to “look after
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your own things,” one must first be able to identify what constitutes one’s own affairs and
possessions and then recognize where this sphere ends and the realm of someone else’s
affairs and possessions begin. Hence, it is wrong to desire something which rightfully
belongs to someone else, since this represents a failure to recognize that one’s own interests
are not unrestrained or, even worse, to recognize this fact but yet to press on all the same.
In other words, as Balot very helpfully explains, “because greed, in the Greek conception,
usually implied taking from others what is rightly theirs, it is clear why Herodotus should
conceive of greed as the offspring of hubris, which is an arrogant disregard for others.”47
Thus, it is no surprise that those in the Histories who do not “mind their own business” and
try to meddle with the belongings of others are presented as blameworthy. For instance,
returning to Gyges and Candaules, Herodotus’ account of the incident begins with the
comment that “it was necessary that things go badly for Candaules” (1.8.2: χρῆν γὰρ
Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς)48 and concludes with the ominous prediction that
“retribution would come on behalf of the Heraclids against the fifth generation of Gyges’
descendants” (1.13.2: Ἡρακλείδῃσι τίσις ἥξει ἐς τὸν πέμπτον ἀπόγονον Γύγεω), a
reference to the fate of Croesus.49 In other cases too Herodotus demonstrates that greed
does not pay off, as when the sailors who think themselves so clever by kidnapping Arion
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are eventually caught (1.23-4) or when Darius opens the tomb of Nitocris in Babylon only
to find that she had left behind a note condemning her grave-robber as “shamefully greedy”
(1.187.4: αἰσχροκερδής). More importantly, however, I hope to emphasize that the
warning to “look after your own things” should perhaps be taken to extend beyond
acquisitiveness or injustices against particular individuals, but instead is meant as a
cautionary warning against any action which exceeds one’s own domain.
To make this point, it is worth remembering – both here and throughout this thesis
– that the argument from analogy is a common Herodotean strategy and that small-scale
occurrences often signal some larger or more overarching idea.50 As an example, Solon
makes explicit the belief that human fortune is like that of cities and that no one is entirely
self-sufficient (1.32.8: ὥσπερ χωρῇ οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα), something which
Herodotus has suggested with his explanation for discussing both large and small
communities in the Histories (1.5.3: ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα).51 For this
reason, it is not unreasonable to draw connections between how the “look after your own
things” theme is applied to the ways in which individual actions against other humans are
portrayed as just or unjust and the ways that it may be applied to actions toward other
entities, particularly the gods and other nations or peoples.
The first of these is quite simple and reflects what we have already seen in the story
of Croesus and his desire to outwit the god Apollo and his oracular wisdom. If my view is
correct that “looking after your own things” is akin to the idea of recognizing and abiding
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by the realities which should restrain one’s desires and behaviors, then it is clear how
Croesus violated this advice by muddying the distinction between human and godly
knowledge and attempting to “usurp a quasi-divine position,” to borrow Kindt’s very
memorable description of his test of the oracle.52 This same general idea – that it is possible,
though of course ill-advisable – to infringe upon the realm of divine influence, appears
repeatedly throughout the Histories, as when Pheretime of Barca will invite retribution for
taking on the role of dispensing punishment (4.205);53 additionally, it has been argued that
certain figures in the Histories fail outright at recognizing their own mortality, the very
characteristic separating humans from the gods.54 Hence, it is apparent that people might
fail to “look after their own things” with respect to the gods and the relative stature of the
mortal and divine spheres of the world.
More interestingly, however, is the correlation of “looking after your own things”
to the dangers of unchecked imperialism. Once again, the situation is made plain by Balot,
who helpfully observes that “imperialism violates a broader notion of justice according to
which it is wrong to take what belongs to another, regardless of any prior contact or preexisting mutual obligations.”55 Just as one man’s goods are his and another man’s goods
are not, each community or nation seems to possess its own lands and sovereignty which
it is unjust to take from them without proper motivation. According to this perspective, for
certain peoples to live in certain places and to enjoy their own beliefs and forms of
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government is simply the nature of the world, something which should be accepted and not
meddled with unnecessarily – an idea we shall encounter again when considering the
prerogative of respecting traditional customs. By its very nature, imperialist expansion
rejects this and attempts to impose “an excess of unity” upon the world, thus representing
a form of greed which has been magnified to the scale of entire nations;56 this connection
is made explicit by the way that Herodotus treats of the collapse of Cyrus’ reign, with the
virtues of ownership and “looking after your own things” framing the beginning and the
conclusion to book one of the Histories.

CYRUS’ SUCCESS AND THE ORIGIN OF HUBRIS

In the interests of brevity, I shall not cover extensively the details of Cyrus’ reign;
it is sufficient to acknowledge that he was extremely successful, first freeing the Persians
from Median domination (1.123-30) and then proceeding to expand their influence across
nearly the whole of Asia by conquering Lydia (following the ill-fated invasion by Croesus,
1.75-84), the cities on the coast of Ionia and Caria (1.141-76), and Babylonia (1.188-91).
To be sure, the accounts of these campaigns are significant for the sake of establishing the
historical record and demonstrating the strength of the Persian empire as a prelude to its
later failures.57 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I wish to stress the effects of
these conquests on Cyrus himself and his transformation into a hubristic ruler, as Herodotus
seems to suggest that the remarkable speed and efficiency with which Cyrus subdued
neighboring states went to his head, so to speak, and caused the king to perceive himself
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as unconquerable and even perhaps god-like.58 To this end, we must focus our attention on
Herodotus’ narration of the events leading up to the final campaign which Cyrus undertakes
and how he, like Croesus before him, exhibits an inability to perceive the tenuousness of
his good fortune.
Following the stories of his other conquests, Herodotus informs us that Cyrus
“desired to bring the Massagetae under his rule” (1.201.1: ἐπεθύμησε Μασσαγέτας ὑπ᾽
ἑωυτῷ ποιήσασθαι) and goes on to explain that this people lived across the river Araxes
to the east of the Caspian sea.59 What is much more interesting, though, is the explanation
we receive for the motivation behind this campaign, since Herodotus is quite specific in
outlining the reasons which led Cyrus toward his course of action:
“For the things which excited him and caused him to undertake [his war
against the Massagetae] were both many and great: first his origin, which
seemed to be something more than human, and second the good luck with
which all of his previous wars had occurred, as wherever Cyrus had led his
army, that nation was without any method of escaping.”
Πολλά τε γάρ μιν καὶ μεγάλα τὰ ἐπαείροντα καὶ ἐποτρύνοντα ἦν,
πρῶτον μὲν ἡ γένεσις, τὸ δοκέειν πλέον τι εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, δευτέρα
δὲ ἡ εὐτυχίη ἡ κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους γενομένη: ὅκῃ γὰρ ἰθύσειε
στρατεύεσθαι Κῦρος, ἀμήχανον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔθνος διαφυγεῖν.
(1.204.2)
Considering the first of these points – that is, Cyrus’ perceptions about his allegedly
beyond-human upbringing – we have seen previously that the demarcation between human
and divine is of the utmost importance to Herodotus, as my discussion of oracular
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knowledge in the Croesus logos has shown. While it is not explicitly stated what it might
mean for one’s origin to be “something more than human,” the most extreme interpretation
would seem to be that Cyrus views himself as immortal. If this is the case, his hubris is
undeniable and would be blatantly obvious to the reader; death is the ultimate human limit
and an inescapable feature of reality.60 However, even if we are not meant to understand
having an origin “more than human” as a claim on immortality, Cyrus still encroaches upon
the sphere of divine activity by presuming to know the course of fate or the intentions of
the gods, thereby replicating Croesus’ mistake of not recognizing the relative
powerlessness of man and the inability to predict the future. Although it is certainly true,
as Pelling notes, that certain moments in the Histories “[draw] the audience irresistibly into
accepting a divine dimension” and it may very well appear that Cyrus was somehow
ordained by the gods,61 we should also recall that the audience stands in a privileged
position to know the full outcome of events, something impossible for the historical actors
themselves.
This leads us directly to the second aspect of Cyrus’ motivation to launch a
campaign against the Massagetae – namely, his confidence that previous successes in war
are a sure sign that he will be victorious again. Now, as I hinted at with my comments on
Herodotus’ treatment of character in the introduction to this chapter, it is important to avoid
the temptation of identifying exact parallels between logoi, lest we fall into the trap of
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thinking that Herodotus is merely a determinist who sees the same actions as always and
inevitably leading to the same outcomes. To the contrary, literary tactics such as repetition
and analogy enable the reader to anticipate the consequences of choices and to draw afterthe-fact conclusions by picking up on signals which have also been present in earlier
events.62 With this having been said, however, it is difficult to overstate the parallels
between Cyrus’ supreme confidence in his previous good luck and Croesus’ hope that he
could be labeled the happiest man based upon current prosperity and success. In their
respective situations, both kings demonstrate their inability to understand the fleeting
nature of fortune or to grasp the fact that one who is perfectly happy at a given instant may
tomorrow be cut down to size by the mysterious twists of fate or the jealous gods,63 just as
cities which were once powerful are now small and those which are great now were small
in the past (1.5.4: τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ σμικρὰ αὐτῶν γέγονε: τὰ δὲ
ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά). To put it another way, neither Croesus nor
Cyrus fully recognize that certain aspects of life are simply beyond the realm of human
control; they are presumptuous and incorrectly assume that reality can be bent into
accordance with their desires and, moreover, that good fortune is eternal once achieved.
For Croesus, his hubris was made manifest in his inability to defer to the superiority of
divine knowledge, resulting in a disastrous campaign inspired by a faulty interpretation of
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largely downplayed by Lateiner (1989), but I tend to accept the views put forth by Shapiro
(1996), esp. pp. 352-5, and Cairns (1996), esp. pp. 17-22, in which the gods resent any
action which would infringe upon their traditional position of supremacy.
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oracles; for Cyrus, his hubris takes the form of an utter failure to respect the dignity and
sovereignty of other peoples, an injustice which is reflected in the policy of unconstrained
imperialism that will go on to characterize every future Persian ruler.64
Before moving on to discuss the ways in which Cyrus is warned about the dangers
of hubris yet defiantly presses ahead with his policy of unwarranted aggression, it is worth
briefly pausing to address a possible issue which may have arisen in my argument.
Specifically, given that I have followed the position of Balot and others by assigning moral
condemnation to imperialist expansionism in the Histories, an objector might wonder why
Cyrus only suffers defeat in his campaign against the Massagetae and not during any of his
earlier wars – say, the conquest of the Lydians or the Babylonians. Indeed, there is much
to suggest that Cyrus should have met his downfall sooner than Herodotus presents it, as
earlier expeditions seem to feature many of the same elements which in other instances are
cues to an impending disaster. For example, with the exception that the conflict against
Croesus and the Lydian kingdom could reasonably be viewed as a defensive action in
which Cyrus himself was attacked and merely retaliated (1.79), each of the other wars
waged by Cyrus is generally depicted as an act of unjustified aggression; though we are
not told specific motivations in all of these cases, the implication is often clear enough: he
did not have any specific claim against the Ionians but nonetheless angrily rejected their
offer of tributary relations and carried on with an invasion (1.141.3-4), while the war
against the Babylonians is introduced in the context of Cyrus’ campaign in Upper Asia
where he was “subjugating every nation and overlooking not a single one” (1.177: πᾶν
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I discuss the idea that imperialism is the defining feature of the Persian empire at length
in my chapter on Xerxes and his motivation for the invasion of Greece, where I shall reflect
on whether this constitutes an inherent moral flaw of that nation (according to Herodotus).
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ἔθνος καταστρεφόμενος καὶ οὐδὲν παριείς).65 Moreover, these previous conflicts are
occasionally punctuated by disruptions of the natural world which hint at a sense of
arrogance or indifference on the part of the actor; most notably, Cyrus is angered when a
royal horse drowns in the river Gyndes and “threatened” the river (1.189.2: ἐπηπείλησε)
by diverting the water’s flow into three hundred and sixty small streams. In light of what
has been said here, it would seem that I am perhaps on difficult ground to explain why
Cyrus’ downfall occurs when and how it does; however, I hope that these concerns may be
addressed by recalling Herodotus’ narrative intentions and the nature of historical
explanation.
While introducing his discussion on the version of Cyrus portrayed in the Histories,
Avery comments that the ways in which Herodotus makes use of the first Persian ruler are
reflective of the more general idea that “he manipulated [his content] for certain purposes,
some of which we would call historical, but many of which we would call literary.”66 Now,
if we consider what this might mean for the question currently at hand, Avery’s insight
seems relevant in at least two important senses. First, it offers an important reminder that
Herodotus’ text is basically a work grounded in reality; that is to say, even though the
meaning of ἱστορίη encompasses much more than does our own modern perception of
“history,” it would be disingenuous to act as if Herodotus has written a work of fiction with
no regard for the actual truth of events.67 This is particularly true if we understand
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Very similar language – that of conquering every nation – is used in the blatantly
hubristic speech given by Xerxes at 7.8, which I shall discuss in the relevant chapter below.
66
Avery (1972) p. 530.
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Attempts to neatly categorize the Histories into a particular genre seem problematic
given the vast scope of material covered. Cf. Lateiner (1989) ch. 1, pp. 13-51, who
generally views Herodotus as having developed a new kind of work, and Pelling (2019)
ch. 4, pp. 58-79, who views him as adapting and expanding prior intellectual models.
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Herodotus as wishing to convince his audience that his research and observations are valid
and believable,68 since failure to do so would doubtlessly undermine whatever moralistic
claims are stated or implied throughout the work. Hence, we can reasonably say that at
least one reason why Cyrus’ downfall might occur at the point it does in the narrative is
that the historical figure Cyrus was defeated in his campaign against the Massagetae, not
in the conquest of Lydia or Babylonia. Yet this is not a satisfactory answer, for it does not
manage to explain away all of the thematic elements which I have laid out in the previous
paragraph.
To this end, our attention to the literary aspect of the Histories should lead us to
recall an important idea which has already been used several times throughout this thesis
– namely, that events are subject to a model of explicability without predictability. We
have already encountered Pelling’s example of the soccer match as a convenient way to
conceptualize this principle, but he also provides a further comparison which may prove
useful: the science experiment. 69 In modern science, it is assumed that one could repeat an
experiment many times and one would always achieve the same results; historical events,
by contrast, are governed by so many overlapping and even opposing factors – both human
and divine – that we cannot ever hold them to the same standard. Accordingly, even if it is
correct that Herodotus views imperialism of the kind practiced by Cyrus “as immoral and
doomed to failure,”70 we need not expect that every transgression or act of unjust aggression
will always lead to defeat. Rather, as Herodotus himself states and as I myself have
emphasized previously in this thesis, he is often more concerned with letting the reader
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Cf. n. 34 above for Herodotus as seeking to argue or convince.
Cf. Pelling (2019) pp. 47-9.
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Balot (2001) p. 134.
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know what kind of person a ruler was (1.95.1: ὅστις ἐὼν) so that the audience is, in
Pelling’s words, “handled, even trained” to understand a downfall when it does ultimately
occur.71 In more concrete terms, there would be no way of knowing that any given
transgression – in this case, an unprovoked military invasion – will end in disaster, nor
even any way of proving definitively that the final unjust deed was the direct cause of the
eventual failure. However, the thematic point is made all the same; having witnessed that
Cyrus was someone who time and again tested his luck by not only continuing his unjust
course of action but in fact becoming even more overconfident, the reader finds it difficult
not to connect the dots and accept Herodotus’ moral condemnation. Thus, in the Cyrus
logos, the actual course of events – a series of impressive victories leading up to
catastrophic failure – reinforces the dramatic tendency to present a king’s rise and fall as
both unexpected and at the same time entirely understandable. This is only reinforced by
the fact that Cyrus is warned about the dangers of exceeding his own rightful sphere of
influence, as I shall now go on to explain.

TOMYRIS’ WARNING, CROESUS’ ADVICE, AND THE CONSCIOUS DECISION TO TRANSGRESS

We have seen already through Croesus’ interactions with Solon – and perhaps to a
lesser extent with the oracle at Delphi – the way in which kings on their way to test or
overstep the limits of human influence are presented with advice or counsel which, if
heeded, would allow them to realize their misconceptions about the nature of the world and
perhaps avert destruction. For Cyrus, the role of “warner” is filled in the traditional sense
by the now-enslaved Croesus; however, this logos is unique in that he receives his most
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direct signal of caution from an unlikely source: his enemy, the Massagetaean queen
Tomyris.72 The messages sent by Tomyris in advance of the war between her people and
the Persians, like those of all “warner” figures in the Histories, serve the purpose of making
explicit the transgression which is about to occur and reaffirming some kind of moral or
ideological principle which the narrator or other characters have previously hinted at but
never stated directly.
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the notion that greed, and thus also the policy of
imperialism which mirrors greed on a larger scale, is presented by Herodotus as unjust and
generally unsuccessful – for instance, recall the tomb of Nitocris which promised great
riches but was in fact empty. This idea lies at the heart of Tomyris’ argument in which she
urges Cyrus to abandon his campaign and allow a peaceful coexistence. After first rejecting
his efforts to obtain power over the Massagetae under the guise of offering marriage
(1.205),73 Tomyris sets out her view that Cyrus is taking an unnecessary risk and that he
should, to use an expression we have encountered previously, “mind his own business.”
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The closest parallel may be Demaratus’ speech to Xerxes at 7.102-4; although Demaratus
is not Xerxes’ enemy, as a Greek he is perhaps meant to provide a kind of foil to the
overzealous Persian ruler. I return to this passage for other thematic reasons later in this
thesis.
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Deceit is another form of morally problematic behavior which usually proves
unsuccessful in the Histories. A notable passage is 3.19-22, where an Ethiopian king
rebukes spies sent by Cambyses and informs them of their master’s injustice; this is
discussed tangentially by Balot (2001) pp. 106-7. Yet, Herodotus does speak of certain
acts of deception in a neutral or even quasi-positive manner, e.g. 2.121 (on a pair of brothers
who outsmart the Egyptian ruler Rhampsinitus) or 8.74-83 (on how Themistocles pulls a
ruse to ensure that a sea battle will be fought at Salamis). It is beyond the scope of this
project to analyze why certain acts of deception are morally permissible, but in general the
intention and ramifications on the broader community seem to be important factors; for
analogies, cf. Bosak-Schroeder (2020) and Christ (1994) on how actions which would
otherwise be condemnable are occasionally treated with praise.
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Although the speech is relatively short, there are several points worth parsing out from the
text itself:
“King of the Medes, I advise you to abandon this enterprise, since you
cannot know if in the end it will do you any good. Rule your own people,
and try to bear the sight of me ruling mine. But of course you will refuse
my advice, as the last thing you wish for is to live in peace. Listen then – if
you are so bent upon trying your strength against the Massagetae, give up
the laborious task of building that bridge, and let my army withdraw three
days’ march from the river, and then come over yourself. Or, if you prefer
it, retire the same distance yourselves, and let us meet you on your side of
the river.” (Trans. A. de S.)
ὦ βασιλεῦ Μήδων, παῦσαι σπεύδων τὰ σπεύδεις: οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης εἴ
τοι ἐς καιρὸν ἔσται ταῦτα τελεόμενα: παυσάμενος δὲ βασίλευε τῶν
σεωυτοῦ, καὶ ἡμέας ἀνέχευ ὁρέων ἄρχοντας τῶν περ ἄρχομεν. οὔκων
ἐθελήσεις ὑποθήκῃσι τῇσιδε χρᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντως μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽
ἡσυχίης εἶναι: σὺ δὴ εἰ μεγάλως προθυμέαι Μασσαγετέων
πειρηθῆναι, φέρε μόχθον μὲν τὸν ἔχεις ζευγνὺς τὸν ποταμὸν ἄπες, σὺ
δὲ ἡμέων ἀναχωρησάντων ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τριῶν ἡμερέων ὁδὸν
διάβαινε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέρην, σὺ τὠυτὸ τοῦτο ποίεε. (1.206.1-3)
To begin with a very general point, we should observe that the overall tone and content of
Tomyris’ response is perhaps not what would otherwise be expected from someone in her
situation; that is, faced with the threat of utter destruction for herself and her people – recall
that Cyrus had never before been defeated up to this point – she does not display any hint
of obsequiousness in urging the Persian ruler to give up his ambitions.74 Much to the
contrary, Tomyris appears to speak from the position of a superior – note the use of

74

Tomyris’ sense of defiance may be partially attributed to the reputation of the Massagetae
and other nomads for being a tough and unconquerable people, as explained by Herodotus
at 4.46. Redfield (1985) examines the significance of “hard” versus “soft” nations in the
Histories.
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imperative verbs – who is able to confer moral and practical wisdom upon her enemy.75
Indeed, her message mirrors many of the same ideas about human fortune which have been
found in the speeches of Solon and especially of Gyges; it is to these themes that our
attention turns next, beginning with the similarities to Solon’s perspective on the trouble
of not knowing the course of future events.
In my chapter on the Croesus logos, I posited that Solon speaks for the author
himself when he expresses the view that certain things are simply beyond the scope of
human knowledge and control and, accordingly, that one should acknowledge the
uncertainty of fortune and temper one’s desires. Central to the Solonian outlook is the
importance of “looking to the end” before drawing conclusions, and it is on this point that
Tomyris most directly echoes his advice. Specifically, she pushes Cyrus to give up his
effort to conquer the Massagetae not because of its inherent immorality or her deep
commitment to peace – though she, or at least Herodotus speaking through her voice, may
have felt this way76 – but because it is impossible to know if the outcome will be to his
advantage “when these things are done” (1.206.1: ταῦτα τελεόμενα). Now, the point here
is not simply to mention that both Solon and Tomyris talk about the “end” using τέλος and
its derivatives; while this is clearly true, my real aim is to highlight that each of these
speakers presents a similar underlying message about risk and the unpredictability of the

75

The tone of her speech might also reflect that Tomyris does not fear retaliation from
speaking the truth to Cyrus. Though somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis, it may be
interesting to consider whether there is a difference between the quality of advice given by
“outsiders,” so to speak, versus that given by people who are in some way connected to the
advisee; for a similar idea, cf. n. 86 below on how Persian kings surround themselves with
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future. Just as Solon knew that those who “end well” are the ones able to avoid the
misfortune which so often accompanies extreme success and thus he was unwilling to
include Croesus prematurely among their ranks because of his current wealth,77 so too
Tomyris recognizes that warfare includes an element of chance and that Cyrus’ luck may
not hold indefinitely as he continues to expand the boundaries of the Persian state and
trample upon other nations.78 Proceeding from this point, Tomyris’ message takes a more
explicitly didactic turn as she brings not only the story of Cyrus, but indeed the entirety of
book one, back to where it began by restating the moral counsel to “look after your own
things.”
As noted above, the story of Gyges and Candaules begins the “historical” action of
the Histories with a prescription of the need to “look after your own things” (1.8.4:
σποκέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ). I recall this point for the simple reason that Tomyris’
suggestion to “rule your own people” (1.206.1: βασίλευε τῶν σεωυτοῦ) is nearly identical
in its grammatical construction. In each case we observe a command – an infinitive
implying necessity and an ordinary imperative, respectively – which urges the addressee
to restrict his actions to his own belongings or interests as delineated through the reflexive
pronoun. Thus, as hinted at previously, the lesson that one ought to acknowledge
reasonable limits upon one’s desires appears both in the very first story which opens book
one and again in the final narrative which describes Cyrus’ downfall and transitions the
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Cf. Shapiro (1996) p. 351, where she notes that Solon’s examples of the happiest men –
Tellus the Athenian or the brothers Cleobis and Biton – “did not have to suffer the decline
that follows a human triumph.”
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Cf. Pelling (2019) p. 12, where he expresses the idea that the unsuccessful attacks made
by rulers are those in which the risks outweigh the possible rewards. For an interesting
exploration of a related concept, cf. also Konijnendijk (2020), who discusses the use of the
verb κινδινεύειν and related terms to describe the risk inherent in war.

41
reader to the next Persian ruler. Aside from the fact that repetition of this sort provides
structure to the various individual events in the Histories by way of the so-called “ring
composition,”79 it has been argued that beginnings and endings are of special thematic
interest for Herodotus and his work.80 With this in mind, the effect of Tomyris’ speech is
to draw out and remind the audience of the similarity between acts of wrongdoing on the
scale of nations (i.e., Cyrus’ impending invasion) to those on the scale of individuals (i.e.,
Gyges’ desire to let another man see his naked wife). Moreover, it amplifies and legitimizes
her position by placing it in line with a previous “warner” whose advice has already been
proven true and by making her appear prophetic when she acknowledges that “obviously
you will not be willing to heed my warning,” (1.206.2: οὔκων ἐθελήσεις ὑποθήκῃσι
τῇσιδε χρᾶσθαι). Before his attack, however, Cyrus receives a message of restraint from
one additional source: the captive king Croesus, who demonstrates that he has managed to
learn the reality of the world but is still unable to avert the catastrophe about to occur.
When we left Croesus, he had badly misinterpreted the oracle of Delphi and,
having substituted his own judgment for proper reflection and moderation, led a disastrous
campaign against the Persians which brought about the fall of the Lydian kingdom and his
enslavement. In the aftermath of his defeat, Croesus lashes out at Apollo and claims that
“the one responsible for these things is the god of the Greeks, since he urged me to
campaign” (1.87.3: αἴτιος δὲ τούτων ἐγένετο ὁ Ἠελλήνων θεὸς ἐπαείρας ἐμὲ
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Cf. Immerwahr (1966) ch. 2, pp. 46-78; cf. also Pelling (2019) p. 115 n. 7 for a summary
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Cf., inter alia, Immerwahr (1956) p. 255 and (1966) p. 41 on the thematic reasons for
starting the Histories with Croesus; Kindt (2006) pp. 34-5 on how Croesus represents both
a beginning and an end; and Hau (2016) p. 175 on Herodotus’ habit of providing moral
commentary at the conclusion of a story.
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στρατεύεσθαι) but is rebuffed and eventually concedes that he alone was at fault for his
demise (1.91).81 Before continuing, it is worth noting that there is some debate among
scholars – in particular between Shapiro and Stahl – on the question of whether or not
Croesus has learned his lesson and is now wiser.82 I do not purpose to re-litigate this
question herein; however, it must be admitted that Shapiro’s perspective is generally more
consistent with the interpretation of the Histories that I have been seeking to advance.
Specifically, she argues that Herodotus seems to envision the kind of wisdom gained
through learning from past wrongdoings as an element of relative constancy in a world
where human existence is otherwise unpredictable and subject to the whims of fortune.83
This view aligns nicely with Croesus’ new role as a “warner” figure who becomes a
mouthpiece for the narrator’s outlook about the world; in this sense, his newly-acquired
wisdom is not any particular piece of information but is instead a general realization that
knowledge of the future is unattainable and that one should always bear in mind this fact.
Indeed, this is the great irony of Herodotean knowledge – that the wisest individuals are
those who follow Solon’s lead by disavowing their own ability to know and by recognizing
the incomplete nature of human understanding. Yet, having said this, I now contend that
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Croesus’ advice, for all of its sagacity, is a futile attempt to avert a calamity already set into
motion by Cyrus and his insatiable desire for imperial expansion.
After receiving the message from Tomyris in which she calls for peace, we learn
that Cyrus holds a council of his important advisors to determine the proper course of action
in response to the queen’s offer. Herodotus reports that during the meeting, all of the
Persian generals recommended that Cyrus fight on his own side of the Araxes (1.206.3)
while Croesus alone suggested that Cyrus should cross the river and fight in Massagetaean
territory (1.207); his rationale for opposing the other generals’ opinion is described in this
way:
“If you are defeated, then you would also lose the whole empire, for it is
clear that the Massagetae, if victorious, would not flee back to their country
but rather would press on into your empire. On the other hand, if you are
victorious, it would not be as great a victory than had you crossed over into
their country, defeated the Massagetae, and put them to flight.”
ἑσσωθεὶς μὲν προσαπολλύεις πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν. δῆλα γὰρ δὴ ὅτι
νικῶντες Μασσαγέται οὐ τὸ ὀπίσω φεύξονται ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὰς σὰς
ἐλῶσι. νικῶν δἐ οὐ νικᾷς τοσοῦτον ὅσον εἰ διαβὰς ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων,
νικῶν Μασσαγέτας, ἕποιο φεύγουσι. (1.207.3-4)
From the standpoint of mitigating risk, particularly since he has just emphasized that Cyrus
is only human and his good fortune may not last forever (1.207.1-2), Croesus provides
sound counsel to his master; especially notable, as scholars have observed, is the fact that
he acknowledges the possibility of defeat.84 However, Avery keenly points out that while
Croesus’ speech may be “good as far as it goes,” it is only the second-best advice given to
Cyrus and that the king would have been better off listening to his enemy.85 Though I agree
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with this general assessment, it requires some clarification to explain precisely how
Croesus’ advice falls short of that offered by Tomyris. Namely, I suggest that the only
correct move for Cyrus – i.e., the move which could have prevented his death and the defeat
of the Persian army – would have been to abandon his effort to conquer the Massagetae
altogether. In other words, because Cyrus had made up his mind that he really desired to
go ahead with the attack (1.206.2: μεγάλως προθυμέαι Μασσαγετέων πειρηθῆναι) and
does not even bother to consider the offer to live in peace, he has already committed the
transgression that will precipitate his downfall. Tomyris has recognized this and, because
she has nothing to lose, explicitly calls out the injustice of the Persian attack as a violation
of the prerogative to “look after your own things.” Croesus, on the other hand, though he
may be equally aware that Cyrus’ unchecked aggression is an affront to the limits of human
achievement, is unable to speak the full truth to the king and thus opts to guide him toward
the second-best course of action.86 Whatever the case, the stage is now fully set: Cyrus has
been warned both directly and indirectly about the dangers of his unrelenting greed and
desire for power but chooses to follow through regardless, a mistake which proves to be
literally fatal.

CYRUS’ KRISIS MOMENT: HIS ATTACK ON THE UNTAMED MASSAGETAE

To the shock of virtually no one, given what Herodotus has already gone to great
lengths to impress upon his audience about Cyrus’ character, the king chooses to follow
the advice given by Croesus and press his attack into Massagetaean territory (1.208). At
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this point, it is fair for us to conclude that Cyrus has passed his point of no return, as he has
been warned by friend and foe alike of the dangers involved in his continual efforts to
subdue foreign peoples but remains undaunted and arrogantly confident; yet, Herodotus
goes further still in demonstrating that Cyrus thought nothing of pushing his luck to the
brink and disrupting the order of the world. By setting a trap for the enemy forces to lure
them in with wine and other luxuries,87 the Persians win a small skirmish where they defeat
one-third of Tomyris’ army and capture her son (1.211). It is here that Tomyris takes the
unusual step of sending a second message to Cyrus, suggesting that he can return to Persia
“unharmed” (1.212.3: ἀζήμιος) if he returns her son and is willing to accept having
“shamefully offended” only one-third of the Massagetae (1.212.3: κατυβρίσας).88
Unsurprisingly, the king is unwilling to consider this offer, prompting a full-scale battle in
which the Persians are defeated, Cyrus himself killed, and his body mutilated (1.213-4).
After a short digression on the customs of the Massagetae, the text proceeds to the infamous
reign and misdeeds of Cambyses.
In this way, book one, which began with the morally ambiguous story of Gyges and
Candaules and the exhortation to “look after your own things,” comes full circle with
Tomyris’ brutality juxtaposed against her superior understanding of fortune and the state
of human affairs.89 Between the logoi on Croesus and Cyrus, including the many
digressions which I have not been able to cover, the first book of the Histories has laid out
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the narrator’s basic sense of the world: the fact that life is unpredictable and there are
certain things which humans, for reasons sometimes clear and other times not, simply
should not attempt. The story of Cyrus is an especially powerful reminder of this reality,
since his demise is both so catastrophic and at once so preventable, and thus serves as a
useful reference for the fates of later kings who will seek to avoid replicating his failures.
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CAMBYSES: THE LIMIT OF CUSTOMARY BEHAVIOR
INTRODUCTION

Cyrus’ unjust transgression and subsequent demise, a critically important moment
which closely foreshadows the actions of Xerxes at the climax of the Histories, is just the
first of many outrages committed by Persian kings in their efforts to acquire territory and
power. Following the death of the great founder at the hands of the Massagetae, we learn
that the kingship passed to his son Cambyses (2.1), a somewhat curious figure
characterized both by triumph and grave wrongdoing. On the one hand, his reign represents
both the pinnacle of the Persian state’s influence before it was faced with rebellion and
large-scale military failure; at the same time, it also embodies – in the eyes of Herodotus –
the most offensive and egregious kinds of moral transgressions. Indeed, Cambyses stands
out as the only one of the hubristic rulers whom the narrator regards as genuinely insane
(3.38.1: ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης), a factor which we shall have to consider when
evaluating his failures.
The narrative of Cambyses’ reign, though introduced immediately after the death
of Cyrus, is delayed by the lengthy Egyptian logos in which Herodotus expounds in great
detail the history of that country and the nature of its land and people. Above all, however,
he appears interested in recounting the culture of the Egyptians, beginning from the
observation that they “established practices and customs that are almost completely
opposite to the rest of mankind” (2.35.2: τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι
ἀνθρώποισι ἐστήσαντο ἤθεά τε καὶ νόμους). While these extended digressions – his
descriptions of customs alone take Herodotus from 2.35 to 2.98, not even to mention the
historical and geographical commentary – might at first glance seem unrelated to the
upcoming account of Cambyses and his turbulent reign, they are in fact hugely important
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for laying out the thematic basis for the king’s eventual downfall, which Herodotus
portrays as the consequence of his inability to abide by and respect cultural norms.90 In this
chapter, therefore, I survey the importance of custom as a kind of metaphorical limit
throughout the Histories and then discuss the ways in which Cambyses is shown to trample
upon the customs not merely of the Egyptians but of his own people as well.

NOMOS AS MORAL PREROGATIVE IN THE HISTORIES

According to Lateiner, the term nomos (νόμος) can refer to anything that
symbolizes the proper bounds in which human activity should be conducted; in this way,
it becomes nearly synonymous with what I have been calling “limits” throughout this
thesis.91 Though Lateiner’s argument is compelling and has much to recommend it, for the
sake of clarity, I shall use nomos only in its more restricted sense – that is, to mean
“custom,” “tradition,” or even “law.”92 However, having said this, it is also difficult to
avoid the realization that nomoi carry with them a certain moral implication, both in so far
as they set out expectations for the ways in which one is to behave and in that those who
act contrary to custom generally suffer misfortunes similar to those who commit other
forms of limit violation. To illustrate this point, we must first consider how morally
authoritative figures throughout the Histories repeatedly emphasize the importance of
obeying nomos, followed by examples of those who fail to heed this advice and suffer;
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ultimately, I hope to elucidate precisely why Herodotus considers nomos to exert such a
great imperative upon human action.
By now, the significance of the “warner” or advisor figure should be a familiar
feature in my analysis of the Histories and the moralistic implications of the text. To review
very briefly: although Herodotus very rarely makes prescriptive recommendations about
the proper decisions that one should pursue through his own narratorial voice, instead
preferring simply to illustrate the consequences of past events, he is able to speak through
historical characters such as Solon or Tomyris in order to explicitly announce the principles
and beliefs which direct his understanding of the world. Typically, these “warners” serve
to cast doubt upon the certainty felt by hubristic leaders and to express aphorisms which
reveal some basic truth about human existence; by doing so, they often appear prophetic in
hindsight after their advice is disregarded, even when the “warners” have never made
definitive claims predicting the course of future events.93 As for the lesson that one always
ought to respect nomoi, an examination of various passages will reveal that this is perhaps
one of the the most commonly repeated doctrines of the Histories, one which occurs all the
way through the work and is re-affirmed by multiple sources of moral authority.
The message that it is dangerous to act outside the realm of custom appears first in
the account of Gyges and Candaules, a story we have already encountered as an example
of the “look after your own things” theme. After cautioning Candaules about the
impropriety of not acknowledging the bounds of ownership – here represented by the
king’s right to have sole access to his naked wife – Gyges goes on to implore that the king
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“not make me do uncustomary things” (1.8.4: σέο δέομαι μὴ δέεσθαι ἀνόμων). As I
have explained in my earlier discussion of this incident, the Gyges/Candaules affair is the
first event described in any level of detail in the Histories, assuming of course that we
overlook the account of the kidnappings of women (1.1-5) which the narrator disregards in
favor of his own research and conclusions. Its prominent location at the very start of the
work gives special significance to the message that Gyges conveys, providing the reader
an introduction to the recurring the themes of recognizing one’s place in the world and of
and not acting contrary to tradition. Moreover, as Lateiner keenly points out, it should be
noted that this is the first of many incidents revolving around the place of women and their
ability to clarify the moral obligations which restrain the men who surround them.94 In this
way and others besides, Gyges’ advice on the need to adhere to customary behavior proves
just as meaningful as the warning to “look after your own things” and is repeated and
amplified later in the Histories.
By far the clearest and most explicit statement about the importance of nomos
comes in the form of an account regarding a sort of experiment carried out by the king
Darius. Specifically, we learn that Darius asked some of his Greek subjects – who were
accustomed to burn corpses – if they would ever consider eating the dead, to which they
responded that no amount of money could convince them to do so (3.38.3); then, he asked
some Callatiae – a people from India who were accustomed to eat the dead – if they would
ever consider burning their ancestors’ corpses, to which they also responded with shock
(3.38.4). This story is widely known and interpreted in a variety of ways by scholars, but
the most interesting aspect of the debate on this passage centers around the question of
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whether Herodotus should be considered a “cultural relativist,” to use a very anachronistic
term, who views all practices as equally worthwhile. On the one hand, it is fairly evident
that the narrator tells his account of history from a Greek-centric perspective; this is true
not only for his treatment of individual topics, such as religion and the divine95 or the
geography of the world where Greece is at the center and contrasts with the “most extreme”
(3.106.1: ἐσχατιαί) regions, but it has also been argued that his overall approach to foreign
peoples and their traditions betrays a tone of indifference or even superiority.96 To be sure,
Herodotus does occasionally speak in critical terms while describing national customs, as
when he notes that the arguments defending temple prostitution are “unpleasant to me”
(2.64.2: ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀρεστά). More often than not, however, he merely describes what he
has seen and been told without passing explicit judgment; for instance, in the story of
Darius’ experiment he takes the responses of the Greeks and the Callatiae as proof that “out
of all the customs, each person, upon examining them, would choose those of his own
people” (3.38.1: ἐκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἑλοίατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς
ἑωυτῶν). While some might take this as a sign that Herodotus is in fact a true relativist
who values all cultures equally,97 I prefer to see the author as making a claim about the
necessity of custom as a feature of human existence;98 indeed, as I shall argue later in this
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chapter, there may be some significance of nomoi as something which merely exist but do
not require deailed explanation.
From a thematic standpoint, however, its primary importance seems to be the
manner in which Herodotus repurposes this demonstration of specific cultural differences
into a general statement about the overall power of nomos, claiming that “it seems to me
that Pindar was correct when he wrote a poem saying that ‘custom is the king of all’”
(3.38.4: ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι).
Briefly setting aside the saying itself, it is essential to observe that here Herodotus is
speaking in his own words to endorse a particular moralistic interpretation. Given the rarity
of this situation throughout the Histories, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the effect
is to give additional weight to the meaning of what is being said, since the message is
spoken directly through the narrator rather than being subtly implied by the course of
events or even filtered through the voice of a “warner” figure.99 As to the implications of
Pindar’s fragment, it appears to provide evidence for the belief that nomos – like death,
lack of knowledge, or the right of ownership – is one of the many factors in the world
which are beyond one’s control and simply must be accepted as limits of human existence
and behavior. Indeed, it might be helpful to recall that in certain contexts nomos can also
mean “law;” hence, just as one must obey the imperatives of a ruler, every individual –
note the universality implied by πάντων – must also accept the commands of custom.
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Such an understanding is explicitly affirmed later in the Histories by the king
Demaratus who, speaking to the hubristic Xerxes, explains why the Spartans will fight
bravely even against apparently overwhelming odds:
“For although they are free, they are not free in every way: custom is their
master, which they revere far more than your men fear you. Indeed, they do
whatever it should command, and it always commands the exact same thing:
that it is not permitted to flee out of battle from any number of men, but
rather by staying in formation they must either conquer or be totally
destroyed.”
ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσί: ἔπεστι γάρ σφι
δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.
ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ: ἀνώγει δὲ τὠυτὸ αἰεὶ, οὐκ ἐῶν
φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι
ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι. (7.104.4-5).
In this speech, Demaratus endorses the idea of nomos as a source of authority and thus
draws out a contrast between the Spartans, who understand the world well enough to
recognize that political autonomy – that is, lack of an absolute monarch – does not imply
absolute freedom, and Xerxes, who believes himself to be unrestrained in his ambitions.100
Having established from these examples that nomos is in fact a form of limit on human
activity, I wish to emphasize its thematic significance by briefly demonstrating that
violations of custom in the Histories are often accompanied by especially brutal or
unpleasant consequences.
As with many of the themes we have encountered thus far, the clearest examples of
contravening nomos are supplied by Herodotus’ narratives on the Persian kings; however,
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for the sake of establishing that custom really is a general moral principle – recall the word
πάντων – and that its transgression is not a unique flaw of that empire, let us first consider
the fates of some non-Persians who also violate customary behavior.101 The strongest
evidence is provided by stories told about two Scythians, a people whom Herodotus claims
“very much avoid adopting foreign customs” (4.76.1: ξεινικοῖσι δὲ νομαίοισι καὶ οὗτοι
φεύγουσι αἰνῶς χρᾶσθαι). The first of these, a man named Anacharsis, is said to have
traveled across much of the known world and to have been impressed by the customs of
the Greeks, especially the worship of the goddess Cybele; upon his return home, he
attempted to practice these rites but was detected, killed by his own brother, and any
memory of him scrubbed away by the Scythians (4.76-7).102 A very similar story is then
told about Scylas: we learn that he was in fact the king of one Scythian tribe who took an
interest in Dionysiac rituals and got into the habit sneaking off to visit the Greeks and
worship with them; like Anacharsis, Scylas too was discovered and chose to flee into exile,
but was eventually returned to his homeland and killed for his transgressions (4.78-80).
Taken together, these accounts illustrate the seriousness of respecting nomos and treating
it as a source of direction for one’s decisions and behavior. As is often the case, Herodotus
does not present a simple didactic message – after all, specific knowledge of Scythian
customs and punishments would have little meaning for his Greek audience – but instead
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seeks to offer a general warning derived from his observations of the world and past
events.103
To further prove the universality of custom as a feature of the world guiding human
behavior – and also to dispel any indication that overconfident and desirous Greeks could
not also violate the prerogatives of nomos – let us examine the narrative of Cleomenes, a
Spartan king who schemed against his co-ruler and was forced into exile only to be returned
to power. According to Herodotus, “a mad sickness overtook him straight away when he
had come back, although he was previously rather insane” (6.75.1: κατελθόντα δὲ αὐτὸν
αὐτίκα ὑπέλαβε μανίη νοῦσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ὑπομαργότερον). Several
explanations of his madness are provided: some claim that he came to a bad end for having
bribed the priestess of Apollo at Delphi while attempting to remove Demaratus (6.75); the
Argives claim that he was punished for killing soldiers who had taken refuge in a sacred
wood (6.76-83); and the Spartans themselves suggested that he had simply gone crazy from
taking up the foreign practice of drinking unmixed wine (6.84).104 Whatever the case, it is
apparent that Cleomenes’ fate reflects the overall sense that one can and will suffer for
failing to observe traditional customs, both those as solemn as upholding the sanctity of
religious spaces or rituals and those as seemingly innocuous as the drinking habits of one’s
culture. Accordingly, as we shall see in greater detail when we return to the story of
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Cambyses himself, Herodotus views it as tantamount to literal insanity for one to question
the nomoi of one’s own people and perhaps even those of other nations as well.
Before discussing the events of Cambyses’ reign and the ways in which he
represents the archetypal violator of nomos in the Histories, I shall attempt to answer the
question of why custom has such moral significance in the first place. As a starting point,
let us consider the etymology of the term itself. I have commented already that nomos has
a range of meanings which run from “law” in the formal sense to “custom” or “habit,” but
beyond this it is worth noting that the word is related to the verb νέμω, which in its most
basic form means something like “distribute” or “hand out.” In fact, Herodotus uses νέμω
in its middle-passive forms to describe possession of territory, such as when he writes that
“the Pelasgians inhabited Lemnos then” (6.138.1: οἱ δὲ Πελασγοὶ οὗτοι Λῆμνον τότε
νεμόμενοι) or when he has Xerxes refer to the Greeks “who inhabit the land of Pelops the
Phyrgian” (7.8C.1: οἳ Πέλοπος τοῦ Φρυγὸς νέμονται χώρην). In these examples, the
implication seems to be that people live on the land which has been rightfully allocated to
them over the course of history, thus giving added weight to the importance of property
and ownership.105 From this, it is only logical to wonder if nomoi in the sense of customs
also hold some kind of privileged status based upon their place as practices or traditions
which have been properly created for or distributed among each nation of the world. As
the preceding discussion may have already indicated, I suggest that customs do indeed hold
a privileged level of moralistic and thematic significance for the Histories and, more
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importantly, I wish to demonstrate how their peculiar quality of being nearly inexplicable
reveals a distinctive element of the narrator’s worldview.
In his analysis of Herodotus’ methodology as a “tourist” against that of a modern
ethnographer or anthropologist, Redfield makes the comment that modern scholars are not
content merely to accept the explanation that different peoples have different practices; that
is, they feel a need to understand some element of why each has its own unique traditions.106
By contrast, Herodotus appears perfectly willing to accept the basic fact that cultures are
different and in fact seems interested in them for precisely that reason – after all, customs,
just like physical landmarks and celebrated deeds, can also be “marvelous” (1.proem:
θωμαστά) aspects of a nation.107 However, it may be that this explanation does not go quite
far enough, since we have seen already that nomoi carry with them a kind of moral
imperative akin to other types of “limits” on human activity. To put it another way, not
only does Herodotus observe the fact that each people has its own customs which are
distinct from those of others, but the very existence of these differences means something
about the nature of the world and how it operates. Borrowing a description frequently used
in Pelling’s analysis of the Histories, the wide variety of customs constitutes evidence for
the idea that “life is simply like that” and that, despite every effort to connect the dots or to
learn from analogy, some aspects of the world are in fact unknowable and inexplicable.108
Herodotus himself expresses a similar view when, speculating about the age and course of
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the river Nile, he writes that it would be best to “let these things be as they are now and as
they have been since the beginning” (2.28.1: ταῦτα μέν νυν ἔστω ὡς ἔστι τε καὶ ὡς
ἀρχὴν ἐγένετο). To be sure, there is a significant difference between, on the one hand,
claiming that one ought to respect nature because of the way it has always been and always
will be and, on the other, making the claim that one ought to respect human customs for
the same reason; but, having said this, we have already seen how the same basic principles
can often apply to seemingly unrelated facets of the world – recall, for instance, the idea
from Lateiner that nomos can encompass everything which I have referred to as “limits.”109
From this point, it is not too great a mental jump to recognize that the value of custom is
derived largely from its place in the existing “balance” of the world and the risk of upsetting
this balance through misguided and misinformed transgressions.110 Accordingly, custom
becomes another one of those things which wise men know simply to accept as a basic
reality of the world; only the foolish or the arrogant would suppose themselves to be above
the dictates of the “king of all.”

CAMBYSES’ MADNESS: KRISIS MOMENT OR GRADUAL DECLINE?

Up to this point, I have attempted to emphasize that each of the hubristic kings
depicted by Herodotus is shown to have achieved some great success before being
overtaken by arrogance and failing to acknowledge the signs and warnings which
encourage him to be content with his previous good fortune. For example, we have seen
109
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that Herodotus is not unwilling to describe how Croesus had successfully brought all of
Asia Minor under his control and become the richest man in the world, nor does he fail to
discuss the importance of Cyrus’ conquest of the Medes and the establishment of Persian
domination in Asia. In the case of Cambyses, however, the story is much different; as
Marincola explains, Cambyses is “the closest that Herodotus comes to a stereotypical
portrait of a ruler,” in whose logos the narrator has “overlooked the actual achievements of
the king, and has instead focused on his instability and madness.”111 Indeed, the account of
Cambyses’ conquest of Egypt – a moment which represented the last major triumph of
Persian expansionism before ill-fated campaigns into Europe – is not only delayed from
the beginning of book two where it is first introduced, but is completed entirely within a
single short section of the text (3.1-16). Likewise, the narrative we are given of the king’s
downfall is also somewhat unusual in contrast what we have come to expect based upon
the ends of the Cyrus and Croesus logoi; however, I hope to suggest that these differences
do not undermine, but in fact work to reinforce, the underlying moralistic idea that one
should recognize the presence of limits on human behavior.
To be sure, Cambyses is not exempt from the imperialist instincts which
characterized his predecessors, as we learn that he planned to carry out three separate
campaigns following the subjugation of Egypt: an assault on Carthage never materializes
due to the refusal of the Phoenicians to attack their own colony (3.19); a force sent to the
oracle of Ammon at Siwa, deep in the desert, is lost and never heard from again (3.26); and
the expedition led personally by the king against the Ethiopians who live at the “ends of
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the earth” (3.25.1: ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα γῆς)112 falls into a state of starvation and cannibalism
which, according to Herodotus, was the product of Cambyses’ lack of planning (3.25). Yet
unlike Croesus and Cyrus – both of whom were defeated in battle and lost their kingdom
and their life, respectively – Cambyses himself does not suffer directly as a result of these
missteps. Rather, the failure of the military campaigns is connected only incidentally to his
ultimate downfall, since Cambyses’ return from Ethiopia provides the setting for the
inexcusable transgressions which serve as definitive proof of his madness and becomes his
version of the krisis moment.
Herodotus reports that shortly after Cambyses arrives back in Egypt from his
disastrous march against the Ethiopians, the locals are in the process of celebrating the
arrival of the god Apis into his corporeal form as represented by a calf with certain
distinctive markings (3.27-8). The king, angered that people would be rejoicing at such a
time and unwilling to consider the possibility that he could be misinterpreting the meaning
of their happiness, attempts to kill the calf (3.29.1: θέλων τύψαι τὴν γάστερα τοῦ Ἄπιος
παίει τὸν μηρόν) before proceeding to ridicule the priests (3.29.1: γελάσας).113 That this
is the point of no return for Cambyses becomes apparent as the remainder of his narrative
plays out; while it is not a direct parallel with the krisis moments of Croesus and Cyrus, it
shares the same basic quality – namely, it is an act of physical aggression directed against
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an undeserving victim and becomes an identifiable symbol of the king’s arrogance and
inability to restrain himself. Whether or not we wish to accept the view, attributed by
Herodotus to the Egyptians, that Cambyses’ ensuing wrongdoings and acts of madness
were “on account of this injustice” (3.30.1: διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδίκημα) as a kind of divine
retribution from Apis,114 this event is strong evidence that any sense of obligation to custom
felt by the king has long since been disregarded. In the next section of the narrative, we are
told that even before the incident with the calf, both Egyptian and Persian traditions alike
were not safe from violation at the hands of Cambyses. Specifically, we learn that he kills
a number of family members and advisors, including the sister to whom he was married in
contravention to Persian custom (3.30-5) while also looting and desecrating tombs and
shrines in the vicinity of Memphis (3.37) – all deeds which point to the king’s derangement
and lack of moral character.
All of these transgressions, committed seemingly without remorse and against the
warnings issued by Croesus (3.36), lead Herodotus back to the point with which I began
this chapter: the story of Darius’ interrogation of the Greeks and the Indians which
demonstrates the importance of nomos and the fact that Cambyses “was very insane, for if
not he would not have attempted to laugh at sacred and customary things” (3.38.1: ἐμάνη
μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἱροῖσί τε καὶ νομαίοισι ἐπεχείρησε καταγελᾶν).
Thus, narratorial stereotyping notwithstanding, we have in this series of events the
evidence aimed to convince the reader that Cabmyses was the sort of person to think
himself untethered from the limits which constrain other men, one who would face no
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consequences for offending the human and the divine realms alike. Finally, even though
the king’s recognition of his wrongdoing – delivered through a speech after he impales
himself in the thigh, the very same spot where he struck the Apis calf (3.64) – comes too
late to alter the outcome for Cambyses, it provides a useful indication that self-awareness
is still possible for the Persian kings, an idea central to the enigma of the Darius logos.
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DARIUS: MODERATION AND THE NARROW PATH TO AVERT CALAMITY
INTRODUCTION

Up to this point, Herodotus has made use of the arrogance of three separate rulers
to demonstrate the fundamental realities which govern the world and which contribute to
the fragile and limited nature of human existence: Croesus felt that he was better able to
know the future than the gods, ultimately losing his kingdom; Cyrus believed himself to be
nearly divine and unrestrained in his ambitions, eventually losing his life; and Cambyses
erred in thinking that the prescriptions of nomos did not apply to him, losing his sanity. In
their own ways, each of these kings anticipates the greatest and final transgression which
will occur when Xerxes leads his army across the Hellespont in his effort to achieve Persian
domination of the known world. Given what we have already seen about the importance of
patterns and repetition in the Histories as a method to create anticipation and to permit the
audience to arrive at after-the-fact conclusions based upon previous events, it might seem
natural that this moment would follow directly on from the account of Cambyses’ insanity
– the acts of a madman leading on to an even more blatant act of hubris. Instead, the chaotic
reign of Cambyses provides the background for the rise of Darius, a figure who presents
challenges for a simplistic model of rise and fall.
Of course, Herodotus could not simply overlook the entire reign of a Persian king
even if doing so might have been advantageous for his exposition of thematic and
moralistic ideas,115 but we have also seen how every event – or at least every series of
similar events – can eventually be made understandable. Hence, the peculiarities of Darius
and his kingship – namely the lack of a dramatic downfall punctuated by a fatal or near115
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fatal experience for the ruler himself – cannot simply be explained away or dismissed as
the narrator’s interest in faithfully recording the past or as some minor variation on an
established trend of arrogance and its consequences. In this chapter, I suggest that the
Darius logos bears immense symbolic and thematic value as a counterpoint to the rulers
who preceded him and especially to his successor Xerxes; specifically, I contend that while
Darius does in fact exhibit some of the same hubristic character tendencies which we have
seen from the likes of Croesus, Cyrus, or Cambyses and does challenge the proper limits
of his power, he is able to recognize the danger of his overreach before it is too late and
avoids the worst and most tragic aspects of his predecessors’ fates.

THE EXPEDITION TO SCYTHIA: FAILURE WITHOUT CATASTROPHE

The account of Darius and his reign begins amid the chaos left by the downfall of
Cambyses, for we learn even while Cambyses was still alive that the kingship was being
usurped by the two Magi priests – Patizeithes and Smerdis, who bore the name of
Cambyses’ murdered brother (3.61-3). Upon discovering that the Magi had assumed
power, a group of conspirators retake the royal palace in Susa (3.71-9) and proceed to
discuss how they ought to govern the Persian empire, ultimately choosing monarchy and
selecting Darius as their king (3.80-8) based upon a bizarre contest involving divination
and observing the flight of birds. This section is fascinating for several reasons and has
drawn not insignificant attention in the scholarly literature; in particular, the speeches given
in the so-called “constitutional debate” have been mined for evidence to help shed light on
Herodotus’ own political tendencies.116 For the purposes of my thesis, however, the
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Cf. Lateiner (1989) ch. 8, pp. 163-86, on Herodotus’ presentation of different forms of
government and Pelling (2019) ch. 13, pp. 190-8, on democracy in particular.
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importance of this account is primarily to exhibit for the audience exactly what sort of
person Darius is likely to be throughout the stories which follow. To this end, the portrait
which emerges does not seem to be promising; given what we have already seen of the
traits held by Croesus, Cyrus, Cambyses, and various minor figures in the digressions,
Darius is a problematic individual by Herodotean standards. Aside from his general attitude
of rashness and aggression – he advocates an immediate assault on the palace when the
other conspirators favor a cautious approach – Darius is also willing to pursue his own
interests by any means, even employing deception if necessary.117 As an example, he
reportedly claims that “when it is necessary to say something untrue, say it; for we are all
seeking the very same thing, both those who lie and those who are accustomed to tell the
truth” (3.72.4: ἔνθα γάρ τι δεῖ ψεῦδος λέγεσθαι, λεγέσθω. τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλιχόμεθα
οἵ τε ψευδόμενοι καὶ οἱ τῇ ἀληθείῃ διαχρεώμενοι). Accordingly, based upon what we
see of Darius in this first portion of his narrative, the impression is not favorable and he
certainly appears an unlikely candidate for becoming the ruler who will manage to exercise
restraint and avoid the failures of his predecessors.
The initial portrayal of Darius is confirmed by Herodotus’ account of his early
reign, as we are told that he assassinates the satrap Oroetes (3.126-8), conquers and
depopulates the island of Samos – the first Greek territory beyond the Ionian coast to fall
into Persian hands (3.139-49), and brutally suppresses a rebellion in Babylonia (3.150-60).
The revolt of the Babylonians, though covered only briefly by Herodotus, is a significant
event and shares certain features with the Ionian revolt later in the Darius logos, helping to
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illustrate the dangers of a kingdom which overextends itself through aggression and
relentless expansionism. I shall discuss this idea later in the chapter; at the moment, my
aim is simply to demonstrate how Darius sets out on the same foot as other rulers who were
driven by unjust greed for imperial expansion. This point is made clear by his acceptance
of his wife Atossa’s rationale for encouraging an eventual campaign against Greece, as she
argues that “certainly a man who is both young and also the master of great riches should
seem to be achieving something, so that the Persians might realize that they are being ruled
by a man” (3.134.2: οἰκὸς δὲ ἐστὶ ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων δεσπότην
φαίνεσθαί τι ἀποδεικνύμενον, ἵνα καὶ Πέρσαι ἐκμάθωσι ὅτι ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἄρχονται).
Although framed somewhat differently here, the idea is one we have encountered already
and relies upon the belief that conquest is valuable in its own right rather than needing to
be grounded in specific and justifiable goals. There is even a sense, expressed through the
phrase “seem to be achieving something” – note the indefinite τι – that a Persian king faces
an imperative to continually expand the empire and will be deemed unsuccessful for not
doing so, a notion which will be fully embraced by Xerxes.118 From a Herodotean
perspective, such a view is misguided and morally troublesome, since one kingdom’s
unprovoked desire to rule over another is tantamount to stealing away the territory and the
freedom which rightly belongs to a different people.119 With this in mind, an astute reader
might reasonably assume that Darius is spiraling toward his krisis moment and that the
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The insistence on constant activity or achievement is perhaps to be taken as a sign of
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hubris among animals. I shall return to the idea of the necessity to fight and expand when
considering Xerxes’ motivations to invade Greece below.
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Cf. the analysis of the “look after your own things” theme in my chapter on the Cyrus
logos, in which I drew upon the position set out by Balot (2001).
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upcoming invasion of Scythia will prove to be his downfall in the same way as Cyrus’
arrogant campaign against Tomyris and the Massagetae. Yet, we have learned from
countless examples in the earlier sections of the Histories that events rarely play out exactly
as one would have expected, making it a fool’s errand to think that one can predict the
future with any level of confidence.
Turning to the account of the Scythian expedition itself, the fundamental reality is
that two seemingly opposite descriptions apply simultaneously to its outcome: on the one
hand, it is impossible to deny that Darius’ campaign fails badly, since he is unable to defeat
or otherwise subdue the Scythians; however, it is also true that this failure does not bring
about the death or downfall of Darius or of the Persian empire more generally, instead
marking something more akin to a temporary setback than an utter calamity. Given this,
the challenge becomes that of identifying the factors which can be used to retrospectively
explain this course of events and – just as importantly for the sake of this thesis –
considering what, if any, lessons or commentary may be hidden therein. In doing so, I hope
to illustrate once again the thematic and moralistic significance of uncertainty and the
willingness to doubt one’s own strength and knowledge; moreover, I intend to emphasize
the value in considering Herodotus’ interest in presenting to his audience what kind of
person a figure happens to be rather than becoming bogged down in attempting to unravel
the specifics of cause-and-effect.
To take the second point first, my aim is simply to make clear that our analysis can
be much richer and can perhaps reveal far more about Herodotus’ conception of the world
if we are willing to step beyond a desire for an overly mechanistic and rigorous
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demonstration of causality between events.120 Indeed, this is largely why I have relied so
heavily upon the notion of explicability without predictability, since this perspective
requires that we survey the totality of what Herodotus has presented in order to understand
where seemingly extraneous biographical or ethnographic material relates to the main
narrative; in this way, it is the natural extension not only of Immerwahr’s important
observation that “descriptions of single events reach out to find connections with other
events”121 but even of the Solonian advice that one must always “look to the end” before
drawing conclusions. Returning to the case of Darius and the expedition against the
Scythians, for example, it is abundantly clear that the literal cause of his failure is the
decision to relent and give up the campaign rather than fruitlessly continue to pursue his
enemies (4.135), while the reason for his successful escape from Scythian territory can be
attributed to the actions of Histiaeus and the Ionians in defending the bridge across the
Danube (4.137-42). However, simply knowing these details does not necessarily complete
the full picture, as without context they are unable to provide much insight into why Darius’
campaign turned out as it did. For this, it is necessary to consider once again the patterns
which have established moralizing explanations throughout the earlier logoi: problems of
knowledge and interpretation, advice which is either ignored or heeded, and encountering
the limits which provide a boundary for one’s ambitions.
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This should not be interpreted as a criticism of the scholarly literature which has
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less mechanistic perspective may enable us to see more clearly how Herodotus has infused
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relationships employed in the Histories, cf. Immerwahr (1956) and – to a lesser extent –
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Although it may seem somewhat obvious at first glance, it is worthwhile to briefly
reflect on the thematic factors which concern the downfall-like elements of Darius’ failed
invasion. We have already seen from Herodotus’ discussion of his early reign that Darius
is perfectly willing to behave with brutality, dishonesty, and aggression whenever he
believes that these tactics may prove beneficial to his objectives; these traits are in keeping
with the characteristics of his predecessors and carry a certain degree of moral
condemnation in the Histories, as we have observed from speeches rebuking trickery122 and
wanton acts of hostility.123 Further, the Scythian expedition has strong connotations of limit
violation as shown through the inability to remain within geographical boundaries, a theme
which featured strongly in Croesus’ crossing of the river Halys and Cyrus’ of the river
Araxes but was absent from the Cambyses logos. In each of those prior examples, the
physical transgression – i.e., the crossing of the river – came to be a literal representation
of a ruler’s failure to know his place in the world.124 In the case of Darius, the symbolic
importance of this theme is even greater than in previous instances because of the fact that
he breaches not merely the border between the Persian empire and the territory of the
Scythians, but the border between Asia and Europe as well. To demonstrate the gravity of
this situation, consider some of the ways in which Herodotus places special emphasis on
the division of the continents and Darius’ actions: first, at the outset of the Histories, we
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Immerwahr (1966) p. 293, having identified this “river motif,” bluntly observes that “the
crossing of rivers … is always used to prove the hubris” of the crosser. The absoluteness
of Immerwahr’s position about natural geography is challenged by Bosak-Schroeder
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human intervention into nature but rather judges the intention and consequences of each
deed.
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70
learn that the Persians view Asia as their own dominion but Europe as something outside
of it (1.4); second, the narrator frequently opines about the shapes and boundaries of the
continents (e.g., 2.15-7, 4.36-45); third, Darius’ role as the first Persian ruler to threaten
the peoples of Europe has been foreshadowed by the dream which Cyrus experienced
before his attack on Tomyris (1.209-10);125 and, finally, Herodotus goes into some detail
to describe the bridge across the Bosporus strait and its architect Mandrocles (4.87-8),
something we have previously seen only in his speculation on whether Thales of Miletus
helped to ford the river Halys (1.75). For these reasons, it is apparent that Darius’ decision
to lead a force into Europe occurs within a thematic context that is highly suggestive of
arrogance and his incapacity to respect the limited nature of his ambitions; in other words,
the Scythian expedition clearly constitutes a violation akin to the krisis moments of other
rulers.
With this being said, there are certain features present in Darius’ campaign which
serve to defuse the hubristic tendencies of his character and thus to prepare the audience
for explaining the king’s lack of a catastrophic downfall in terms of moralistic themes.
From the very outset, we are told that the expedition is conducted because “Darius desired
to take retribution on the Scythians, since they had been the first to start the injustice when
they invaded Median territory and defeated the ones who resisted in battle” (4.1.1:
ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Δαρεῖος τίσασθαι Σκύθας, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι πρότεροι έσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν
Μηδικὴν καὶ νικήσαντες μάχῃ τοὺς ἀντιουμένους ὑπῆρξαν ἀδικίης). Now, the idea
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the dream of Cyrus and its possible interpretations, cf. Avery (1972) pp. 538-9 with n. 19.
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of retribution has been a core aspect in various scholarly treatments of the Histories,126 but
currently it is worth noting the mere fact that Darius has a definite justification for making
war against the Scythians. The logic behind this view is quite simple indeed: if the
Scythians had already transgressed the boundary of Europe and Asia in the past, then
perhaps the Persians, as the dominant power in Asia, are within their rights to pursue
conflict on the other side of the continental boundary.127 Whatever the specifics of how
Darius’ revenge might be explained, it is a stark contrast with the motivations of previous
rulers who made war simply because they trusted their ability to acquire further wealth and
territory – for instance, recall that Cyrus was driven to attack Tomyris by his supreme
confidence in his super-human origins and his previous good luck rather than by any
particular claim against the Massagetae (1.204). Indeed, the legitimacy of Darius’ war is
seemingly confirmed by the Scythians’ neighbors, who claim that “we think that the
Persians have come not against us, but rather against the ones responsible for creating the
injustice” (4.119.4: ἥκειν γὰρ δοκέομεν οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἡμέας Πέρσας ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰτίους
τῆς ἀδικίης γενομὲνους) and refuse to join forces against the invasion.128 Thus, from the
very moment when he resolves to launch a campaign against Scythia, Darius sets himself
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For a summary of this theme with citations, cf. Marincola (2006) pp. 48-50 with nn.
125-30.
127
An interesting question, though one beyond the scope of this thesis, is whether an initial
transgression renders the limit in question inoperable. In other words, would any
subsequent violation be permissible if it is done in response to an earlier wrongdoing? For
reasons which will become clearer in my discussion of why Xerxes’ invasion of Greece is
far more problematic than the force defeated at Marathon, I suspect the answer is probably
no. Pelling (2019) pp. 36-7 seems to concur with this position when he notes that retribution
can “misfire.”
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For the meanings and moralistic undertones of the word αἰτίη, which I have attempted
to translate neutrally using “responsible,” cf. n. 81 above.
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apart from his predecessors by following a policy of justified retribution rather than
unprovoked aggression.
However, even more helpful as evidence for making sense of Darius’ failure
without suffering are the moments in which he demonstrates an ability to recognize danger
and to distrust his own knowledge and interpretation of the world. Though he does begin
the expedition by rejecting Artabanus’ advice to give up his plans altogether (4.83), Darius
goes on to exhibit a remarkable degree of restraint and wisdom throughout the campaign.
Most notably, this development of his character can be seen in the king’s reaction to the
offerings sent by the Scythians in response to the demand for earth and water. After having
chased his enemies for some distance but never being able to force them into open battle,
we learn that Darius requests the usual symbols of submission but is instead given a bird,
a mouse, a frog, and some arrows (4.131). While the king initially believes that these gifts
are synonymous with earth and water, therefore falling into the mistake of understanding
the world always to his own benefit, his advisor Gobryas presents a different – and much
more ominous – interpretation of the offerings:
“Unless you Persians turn into birds and fly up into the air, or into mice and
burrow under the ground, or into frogs and jump into the lakes, you will
never get home again, but stay here in this country, only to be shot by the
Scythian arrows.” (Trans. A. de S.)
ἢν μὴ ὄρνιθες γενόμενοι ἀναπτῆσθε ἐς τὸν οὐρανόν, ὦ Πέρσαι, ἢ
μύες γενόμενοι κατὰ τῆς γῆς καταδύητε, ἢ βάτραχοι γενόμενοι ἐς τὰς
λίμνας ἐσπηδήσητε, οὐκ ἀπονοστήσετε ὀπίσω ὑπὸ τῶνδε τῶν
τοξευμάτων βαλλόμενοι. (4.132.3)
It is at this point that Darius breaks from the pattern of rejecting sound advice which was
established at the very beginning of the Histories when Croesus disregarded the wisdom
of Solon, for he not only comes around to Gobryas’ position but also recognizes the actions
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of the Scythians themselves – namely, their utter disregard for his invasion force – as a
sign that he should abandon his desire to conquer them (4.134). Now, this is not to say that
Darius is the first to exercise restraint or to heed warnings whatsoever, since we have
already seen that Cyrus took advice – though admittedly not the best advice – from Croesus
before his attack on the Massagetae; moreover, it has been argued that Cyrus’ earlier
campaigns portray a leader much more aware of his place in the world and fearful of divine
retribution,129 while Croesus too was originally content with his domination of Asia
Minor.130 Rather, it seems to me that the key difference in this case is that Darius freely
accepts a version of future events which is not “straight, in the sense that [it means] what
he … wants [it] to mean” 131 – to borrow Kindt’s description for the way that Croesus
interpreted the oracle at Delphi – and thus implicitly acknowledges his own relative
powerlessness to shape the world. Critically, this revelation comes to Darius after he has
already chosen to transgress the proper boundaries of his ambitions but before it is too late
for him to save himself and his army from total destruction. Accordingly, it is possible to
see in retrospect that Darius’ expedition to Scythia reflects both the hubris with which it
begins as well as the sense of control and moderation in which it is concluded and which
permits Darius to escape the type of violent and tragic death suffered by his predecessors.
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DARIUS’ LATER REIGN AND THE IONIAN REVOLT: A REMINDER OF THE NECESSITY TO
“LOOK AFTER YOUR OWN THINGS”

While Herodotus’ narration of the Scythian invasion largely completes the work of
demonstrating what kind of individual Darius is and how he manages to overcome the
flaws which brought down previous hubristic rulers, these events mark only the beginning
of the broader Darius logos. After digressing to describe other military undertakings
ordered by Darius, such as an unsuccessful attack on the Greek colony of Cyrene (4.2005) and the victorious campaign of the Persian generals Megabazus and Otanes in Thrace
and the region around the Hellespont (5.11-27), Herodotus turns to provide his account of
the Ionian revolt. This conflict is vitally important to the development of the Histories in a
number of ways – most obviously, it begins the chain of events which will culminate in the
full-scale invasion of Greece under Xerxes; however, it also develops and advances several
thematic elements of the work as a whole. In his analysis of the structural pattern of the
work, Immerwahr emphasizes that this moment is one of only a few in the Histories where
the “action” is not guided by Persian initiative,132 while Marincola uses the rebellion as a
mid-way point to divide the text in two, noting the way that Aristagoras’ request for help
from the mainland (5.34-8) mirrors Croesus’ desire for a Greek alliance (1.69-70).133 For
the purposes of this thesis and my interest in the lessons Herodotus attempts to convey, I
wish to put forth the notion that the Ionian revolt – or rather revolts more generally, with
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the Ionian simply being the most thoroughly developed example – functions as another
way of representing the danger involved in unjust imperialism and the problem with not
“looking after your own things.”
When introducing this idea in the context of the Cyrus logos, I focused primarily
on explaining the ways in which the prescription to “look after your own things” is an echo
of the underlying view that there is a proper limit to every individual’s desires. Following
the argument of Balot,134 we saw that the personal transgressions of one man – embodied
through the Gyges/Candaules incident – can, by way of analogy, be interpreted to represent
a moral criticism of greed and imperialism in a broader sense. During the course of that
discussion, I noted that the Greek phrase σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ (1.8.4) is often
rendered “mind your own business” in published editions of the Histories, but that I prefer
the more literal meaning “look after your own things” because it preserves some sense of
the physicality implied in Herodotus’ words. Although the difference is subtle and the
overall meaning of the expression is equally clear in both translations, I now wish to
suggest that the literal version carries an additional level of explanatory value for events
such as the Ionian revolt. Specifically, in order to “look after” one’s own belongings, this
would seem to demand an element of physical proximity – after all, one must be present in
order to look at something in a way that is not necessary merely in order to think about or
“mind” one’s place in an abstract sense.
Indeed, applying the literal meaning of Gyges’ warning to the problem of
rebellions, there is an interesting pattern which emerges from the fact that Herodotus
always presents these events in the narrative shortly after a ruler has been away conducting
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a military campaign. For example, as noted at the start of this chapter, the rebellion of the
Babylonians is the first major event of Darius’ reign and thus occurs shortly after
Cambyses’ extended absence for the conquest of Egypt,135 while the revolt of Ionia follows
shortly after Darius returns from his attempt to invade Scythia.136 To be sure, this idea is
never explicitly stated and therefore must be treated with some caution, but it is not
unreasonable to see in this pattern a sense that failure to “look after your own things” invites
trouble; that is to say, by choosing to forego looking at one’s own possessions and instead
to desire things which rightfully belong to someone else, even what once seemed secure
might slip away in the process. Such a perspective fits very nicely with Herodotus’ broader
condemnation of imperial aggression, for it allows us to make sense of the fact that even
nations which have been conquered often remain restive and continue to present difficulties
for their Persian masters.137 Returning to the Ionians in particular, their rebellion –
especially its outcome and effects – signals quite powerfully the uneasy position which
they hold in relation to the Persian empire: on the one hand, they inhabit Asia, the very
continent which the Persians consider to be their own dominion (1.4); on the other, they
are Greeks who have the same desire for freedom as their countrymen on the mainland.
Accordingly, the revolt stands at an interesting point in Herodotus’ broader narrative: while
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The narrator himself, writing in the context of the usurpation by the two Magi, echoes
this general idea when he remarks that “Cambyses the son of Cyrus was lingering around
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it is ultimately suppressed and the status quo ante bellum is restored, the involvement of
the Athenians becomes the cause for a pair of misguided expeditions aimed at the conquest
of Greece. Though it is true that one of these occurs in the reign of Darius, I delay my
discussion until the following chapter; in doing so, I hope to once again employ Darius’
relative good sense and understanding of the world as a foil to the outrageousness and
hubris of Xerxes’ ambitions.
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XERXES: THE ULTIMATE EXPRESSION OF UNRESTRICTED HUBRIS
INTRODUCTION

From our analysis of the turbulent yet somehow remarkably sensible reign of
Darius, we saw a glimpse of the importance attached to restraint and moderation, as these
traits may help to explain the fact that Darius manages to escape the painful and traumatic
suffering of previous kings. However, this was also juxtaposed against the reality that
Darius’ military campaigns – even if carried out for the justifiable reason of seeking to
achieve retribution – are largely conducted in a spirit of hubris which does not
acknowledge the proper boundaries of Persian control and thus prove unsuccessful at
reshaping the fundamental order of the world; further, we saw through the occurrence of
the Ionian revolt how aggression and imperial expansion can have damaging consequences
even in cases where they do not immediately fail, demonstrating once again the recurring
notion that it is better to search out general lessons after the fact than to hopelessly
anticipate the outcome of future events. All of these themes – the problem of imperialism,
its defeat, and its dangers – are explored one final time before the reign of Darius has
expired, as the force dispatched to punish the cities which supported the uprising in Ionia
signals the beginning of the “Persian War” proper and functions as a transition to the
kingship of Xerxes, the events of which form the primary topic of this penultimate chapter.
Unlike the portrayal of Cambyses, there is no indication that the version of Xerxes
presented in the Histories is a madman; rather, his actions are made all the more shocking
by the fact that he is apparently serious about his misguided and hubristic goals. From both
a strictly “historical” (in the modern sense of the term) perspective and also from the
standpoint of thematic and moral patterning which has dominated this thesis, the account
of Xerxes and his reign marks the climax of the work, encapsulating and amplifying every
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form of limit violation previously demonstrated in the actions of previous leaders. Xerxes
consistently exhibits a thorough inability to understand the reality of human existence as
Herodotus has described it: he always interprets events in the most favorable way possible
and tends to reject the advice of those who suggest a more cautious approach; he scoffs at
the importance of nomos and even flouts the traditions of his own people; his ambitions for
imperial expansion are virtually unbounded; and, most vividly, he attempts to alter the
basic features of the world by linking together the continents of Europe and Asia both
physically – that is, with his infamous bridge across the Hellespont – and under the political
domination of the Persian empire. In other words, Herodotus’ presentation of Xerxes is
that of the final form of a hubristic king, a figure who is simultaneously an aberration and
the culmination of those who have come before. Yet, the picture is also not one of a simple
villain, for while it is true on the one hand that Xerxes’ invasion is such a misdeed that
even the gods themselves will appear to intervene on behalf of the Greeks, it would be
wrong to ignore the fact that Xerxes may not act entirely of his own accord and does to
some extent follow the precedent set by his father Darius, a man whom we have seen to be
somewhat less problematic. I consider these difficulties of interpretation and their possible
explanations as the topic of this chapter.

DARIUS’ GREEK EXPEDITION, XERXES’ MOTIVATIONS FOR INVASION, AND THE
MISGUIDED DRIVE FOR ENDLESS REVENGE

Before progressing to the events of the full-scale assault launched under Xerxes, it
is first necessary to tie up the loose ends of the Darius logos which were left unresolved in
the previous chapter by considering the significance of the expedition that suffers defeat at
Marathon. Specifically, I do so with the aim of setting out a basis to contrast the relatively
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modest goals of Darius against the blatant hubris of Xerxes, thereby providing a lens
through which to understand how the latter is a far greater affront to the balance of the
world and the limited nature of human ambition. Now, when we departed from the
narrative, Herodotus had been in the process of recounting the events of the Ionian
rebellion: how Aristagoras of Miletus, on the urging of his father-in-law Histiaeus, rose up
against Persia (5.34-8); how he sought out support from the Spartans and Athenians, being
shunned by the former even after his attempts at bribery (5.49-51) but receiving eager
assistance from the latter (5.96-7); and how his campaign succeeded in destroying the city
of Sardis and its temple to the goddess Cybele (5.100-2) but ended in disaster with the
capture of Miletus (6.18-9) and the subjugation of all Ionia (6.31-2). In the last chapter, my
purpose in discussing this revolt was primarily to illustrate the way in which events of this
sort can be taken as another form of cautionary message about the danger of imperialism.
Additionally, we saw that this moment marks a turning-point in the Histories as a whole,
shifting the focus of the work back to the conflict which was promised at the outset
(1.proem: δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμεσαν ἀλλήλοισι);138 indeed, Herodotus places particular
emphasis on the ships sent by the Athenians, writing in almost Homeric language that they
“became the beginning of evils for both the Greeks and the barbarians” (5.97.3: ἀρχὴ
κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι).139 More directly, the intervention of
Athens becomes relevant as the justification for Darius’ campaign to extract retribution
from the Greeks.
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Cf. nn. 132-3 above.
Cf. Iliad 5.62-3: νῆας ἐΐσας ἀρχεκάκους.
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As with his expedition against the Scythians, the consequences of Darius’ initial
force sent against Greece – namely, that it fails but does not lead to suffering for the king
or the Persians as a whole – can perhaps be made understandable in light of the mindset in
which it was begun and conducted. Notably, there is reason to think that Darius and his
subordinates once again exercise a sense of restraint by not permitting themselves to fall
into reckless and unchecked desire for territorial expansion. While it is true that the king’s
motivation is partially explained as him “wishing to have an excuse to subjugate those of
the Greeks who had not given him earth and water” (6.94.1: βουλόμενος ὁ Δαρεῖος
ταύτης ἐχόμενος τῆς προφάσιος καταστρέφεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοὺς μὴ δόντας
αὐτῷ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ), Herodotus goes on to describe how Darius appointed two
commanders and sent them off with orders to “enslave Athens and Eretria” (6.94.2:
ἐξανδραποδίσαντας Ἀθήνας καὶ Ἐρέτριαν). That is to say, their objective is not
presented as widespread conquest but rather as a targeted attack against the individual cities
which had incited the king’s anger.
Moreover, the generals’ actions during the campaign are reflective of discipline and
moderation, as they largely remain within their guidance to focus on Athens and Eretria
during their campaign (6.95-101) and exhibit a sense of divine reverence.140 For instance,
the commander Datis gives a speech in which he explains that he will spare the holy island
of Delos:
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Acknowledgement of divine signals has been an important theme in the Histories. For
example, we have seen this exemplified though the trend of dreams – e.g., Croesus’ dream
about his son or Cyrus’ dream about the shadow of Darius being cast over Europe and Asia
– and also through the notion that Cyrus recognized the hand of the divine at play while
saving Croesus on the pyre. For the importance of reverence, among other things, in
averting disaster, cf. n. 129 above.
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“I myself intend this, and also it was also ordered of me by the king, to do
no damage to this land in which the two gods [i.e., Apollo and Artemis]
were born, either to the country itself or to its inhabitants”
ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτό γε φρονέω καὶ μοι ἐκ βασιλέος ὧδε
ἐπέσταλται, ἐν τῇ χώρῃ οἱ δύο θεοὶ ἐγένοντο, ταύτην μηδὲν σίνεσθαι,
μήτε αὐτὴν τὴν χώρην μήτε τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὐτῆς (6.97.2)
Now, to be sure, none of this should be taken to suggest that the first Persian expedition to
Greece is somehow a legitimate undertaking which deserved to succeed – after all, the
army is crushed by the Athenians and their allies at Marathon (6.110-7) and returns home.
Just as with the case of the Scythian campaign, it is not my purpose to claim that these acts
of control and restraint are the cause of the events which occurred, but instead merely to
point out the explanatory power of discovering what kind of person Darius has been. Even
in the wake of defeat he exhibits a sort of grace in his leniency toward the captured
Eretrians (6.119), something with which his successor will struggle even in victory, as
evidenced by the latter’s decision to mutilate the body of Leonidas after destroying the
Spartan forces at Thermopylae (7.238).141
Turning now to Xerxes himself, I begin with an analysis of his stated rationale for
the invasion of Greece and a discussion of the shamelessly hubristic attitude that seems to
motivate his desires. All of these ideas are most clearly revealed in the speech given to his
advisors and other Persian officials in which he reveals his plans:
“Do not suppose, men of Persia, that I am departing from precedent in the
course of action I intend to undertake. We Persians have a way of living,
which I have inherited from my predecessors and propose to follow. I have
learned from my elders that ever since Cyrus deposed Astyages and we took
from the Medes the sovereign power we now possess, we have never yet
remained inactive. This is God’s guidance, and it is by following it that we
141
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have gained our great prosperity. … And now at last I have found a way to
win for Persia not glory only but a country as large and as rich as our own
– indeed richer than our own – and at the same time to get satisfaction and
revenge. … I will bridge the Hellespont and march an army through Europe
into Greece, and punish the Athenians for the outrage they committed upon
my father and upon us. … For these reasons I have now prepared to make
war upon them, and, when I consider the matter, I find several advantages
in the venture; if we crush the Athenians and their neighbors who dwell in
the land of Pelops the Phrygian, we shall so extend the empire of Persia that
its boundaries will be God’s own sky, so that the sun will not look down
upon any land beyond the boundaries of what is ours. With your help I shall
pass through Europe from end to end and make it all one country. … Thus
the guilty and the innocent alike shall bear the yoke of servitude.” (Trans.
A. de S.)
᾽Ἀνδρες Πέρσαι, οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθείς,
παραδεξάμενός τε αὐτῷ χρήσομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι τῶν
πρεσβυτέρων, οὐδαμά κω ἠτρεμίσαμεν, ἐπείτε παρελάβομεν τὴν
ἡγεμονίην τήνδε παρὰ Μήδων, Κύρου κατελόντος Ἀστυάγεα: ἀλλὰ
θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει καὶ αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν πολλὰ ἐπέπουσι συμφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ
ἄμεινον. … φροντίζων δὲ εὑρίσκω ἅμα μὲν κῦδος τε ἡμῖν
προςγινόμενον χώρην τε τῆς νῦν ἐκτήμεθα οὐκ ἐλάσσονα οὐδὲ
φλαυροτέρην παμφορωτέρην τε, ἅμα δὲ τιμωρίην τε καὶ τίσιν
γινομένην. … μέλλω ξεύξας τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐλᾶν στρατὸν διὰ τῆς
Εὐρώπης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἵνα Ἀθηναίους τιμωρήσωμαι ὅσα δὴ
πεποιήκασι Πέρσας τε καὶ πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν. … τούτων μὲν τοίνυν
εἵνεκα ἀνάρτημαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς στρατεύεσθαι, ἀγαθὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖσι
τοσάδε ἀνευρίσκω λογιζόμενος: εἰ τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς τούτοισι
πλησιοχώρους καταστρεψόμεθα, οἳ Πέλοπος τοῦ Φρυγὸς νέμονται
χώρην, γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ χώρην γε οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὅμουρον ἐοῦσαν τῇ
ἡμετέρῃ, ἀλλὰ σφέας πάσας έγὼ ἅμα ὑμῖν μίαν χώρην θήσω, διὰ
πάσης διεξελθὼν τῆς Εὐρώπης. … οὕτω οἵ τε ἡμῖν αἴτιοι ἕξουσι
δούλιον ζυγὸν οἵ τε. (7.8a.1-8c.3)
While there is much to unravel in Xerxes’ comments, little of it should come as a revelation
that has not previously been foreshadowed through the hubris of some previous king;
though these sentiments may never have been made explicit on such an ambitious scale,
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they are certainly not new to the general thematic pattern established throughout the
Histories. As a starting-point, let us first discuss the fact that Xerxes acknowledges an
interest in retribution against the Athenians, explaining – in a section not included in the
direct quote – that he resents both their support for the Ionian rebellion and for their defeat
of the previous force sent by his father (7.8b.3). Now, it might appear that Xerxes places
himself on relatively solid moral ground by framing his invasion in these terms, since doing
so would seem to be following Darius’ realistic and tempered justification for war.
However, is not unreasonable to believe that the expedition undertaken by king
Xerxes rests on a shakier foundation than that of his father even if it is ostensibly carried
out for the same purpose – namely, achieving retribution. In retrospect, it is possible to see
that the case for retribution is far weaker in the aftermath of Darius’ failure to subdue the
Athenians at the battle of Marathon, for these events should perhaps have been taken as
evidence that Greece stood beyond the realm of Persian interests. In this way, the king’s
desire to “punish” (7.8b.1: τιμωρήσωμαι) Athens is an example of what Pelling has
labeled “reciprocity misfiring or frustrated,” a situation in which the effort to restore some
previous balance merely becomes the grounds for an unending series of later grievances.
142

In the case at hand, Xerxes is misguided not only in faulting the Athenians for their

successful defense of their own territory against invasion but even in assigning blame for
the burning of the temples in Sardis during the Ionian revolt, since the initial account
(5.100-2) was fairly clear in its implication that the destruction was accidental. Of course,
as Immerwahr notes, Herodotus is perfectly willing to employ a “chain of acts of
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Pelling (2019) p. 36. He then goes on to discuss, at pp. 36-8, the Trojan War and the
kidnappings of women (as mentioned by Herodotus at 1.1-4) as a classic instance
demonstrating the messiness which often characterizes retribution.
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vengeance” in order to connect events which occur even at some distance from their
original cause.143 At the same time, it is difficult to escape from the realization that
retribution carried out by human agents is always imperfect and incomplete in the eyes of
one side or the other.144 The wise person will recognize the point at which it is futile – and
in fact dangerous – to commit further transgressions to avenge a past wrong, something
which Xerxes is utterly unable to do.
More revealing of the king’s hubris than his flawed use of retribution to justify an
invasion, however, is his megalomania and the complete lack of restraint in his
imperialistic ambitions. If we return our attention to the speech itself, it is quite revealing
that Xerxes spends just as long or perhaps even longer describing the likely benefits of
conquest as he does the stated rationale for his chosen course of action – his argument on
retribution is included entirely within 7.8b.1-3 of the text, while the merits of seizing
control of Greece begin at 7.8a.2 and are picked up again at 7.8c.1-3. Of course, length
alone cannot provide definitive evidence for the relative importance of these two ideas, but
the notion that Xerxes might have an underlying motivation for expansion instead of or in
addition to his stated reason is consistent with broader patterns which have been observed
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Immerwahr (1956) p. 249. For an example of events being connected only remotely to
their cause or the broader narrative, recall the discussion of the Arion story in my chapter
on the Croesus logos. The account of Corinth’s involvement in the war against Polycrates
of Samos is also illustrative of this idea: we read that the Corinthians were angered that the
Samians had previously prevented some boys captured from a rival city being sent to the
father of Croesus, whom the young men were meant to serve as eunuchs, and thus
preserved a grudge and were willing to go to war several generations later (3.48-53).
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Divine retribution, on the other hand, is seemingly final, unequivocal, and inescapable.
This is the topic of the chapter by Harrison (2009); cf. also Pelling (2019) p. 37, where he
writes that “once the gods have been brought in … the story stops there.”
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throughout the Histories.145 Indeed, even if the king himself were genuinely to believe that
he is acting in the name of justified retribution, the mere presence of this other motivation
still raises important questions, perhaps implying that he is unable to understand even his
own desires and goals, let alone broader issues such as the correct place of human ambition
in the world. Having said this, what is it precisely that sets Xerxes’ plans on a different
level of moralistic trouble from the many campaigns – both successful and not – undertaken
by previous leaders?
We have already seen on many occasions that the problem with imperialism,
according to the Herodotean worldview, lies in the fact that it constitutes a kind of injustice,
a taking of something over which one has no rightful claim.146 To use language more
directly related to this thesis, it is a violation of limits in both a physical and a symbolic
way – physical in that conducting imperialistic ventures necessarily entails the crossing of
a border such as a river, symbolic in that it requires one nation to believe that its interests
extend into the territory and affairs of another. With this in mind, it is not so much that the
actions which Xerxes proposes in his speech to the Persian nobles are different in nature
from those carried out by his predecessors, even by his own father, but rather that they are
extreme and unprecedented in their scale. Let us focus on his belief that “if we subdue these
people [i.e., the Athenians] and the ones neighboring them [i.e., other Greek cities], then
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This general idea is discussed at some length by Pelling (2019) pp. 8-10, where he
examines the use of the word πρόφασις to reveal a “pretext” which might be at odds with
the actual explanation for an event; later, pp. 82-4, he mentions that ancient medical writers
commonly used this term to denote the most obvious sign of a disease. Immerwahr (1956)
pp. 243-7 also discusses the differences between the words αἰτίη and πρόφασις, though
as usual he is primarily interested in how they relate to cause-and-effect relationships.
146
Cf. the discussion in my chapter on the Cyrus logos, esp. n. 55 citing Balot’s (2001)
position.
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we shall stretch out the land of Persia so that it borders on the aether of Zeus; for the sun
will look down upon no land bordering our own” (7.8c.1-2: εἰ τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς
τούτοισι πλησιοχώρους καταστρεψόμεθα … γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς
αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ χώρην γε οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὅμουρον
ἐοῦσαν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ). Specifically, it is worth observing the extreme confidence with
which Xerxes projects his ambitions onto the future; while it is true that his view is couched
in an “if” statement (7.8c.1: εἰ), we should note that the comment takes the form of a futuremost-vivid conditional construction, implying that he strongly believes these events will
really occur. Hence, by failing to recognize that the future is uncertain and that attempting
to predict its course is beyond the realm of human capacity, Xerxes projects his own
ambitions onto the order of the world and runs afoul of the Solonian wisdom expressed at
the very beginning of the Histories.147
Beyond this, I wish to draw particular attention to the absoluteness of Xerxes’
speech and his apparent desire to make Persian power complete and without exception –
he claims, for instance, that Persia’s conquests will be so thorough that “not one country”
(7.8c.2: χώρην γε οὐδεμίαν) will be left on its borders and notes that even those who are
not blameworthy (7.8c.3: ἀναίτιοι) will suffer the same fate as those who have committed
some perceived wrong. What Xerxes advocates is not just reckless expansionism of the
kind practiced by Cyrus when he attacked the Massagetae simply because he felt that he
could (1.204), but is the philosophy of unjustified imperialism taken to its extreme. If his
predecessors had been willing to test the boundaries of their knowledge and authority,
ultimately pushing too far one too many times, then Xerxes aims to completely eliminate
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Cf. my discussion about Croesus’ conversation with Solon, incl. nn. 23-5 above.
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these boundaries and assume a kind of power which would be far beyond that held by any
human.
Apart from the dangers in trying to compete directly with the divine by extending
his territory to the heavens, a sort of arrogance we have seen to be a course of action
associated with tragic demise,148 there is something particularly troublesome about the
grandiosity of Xerxes’ ambitions and the means by which he sets out to achieve them. In
his discussion of the nature of hubris as a general concept in ancient Greek thought, Cairns
makes the very insightful point that one can be hubristic by possessing a certain state of
mind which prioritizes one’s own honor over that of others, even in the absence of
particular offenses.149 More directly connected to the point at hand, Cairns suggests that the
speech given by Xerxes is an archetypal example of a form of hubris which he calls
“thinking big;” essentially, the idea is that it is an affront – to other individuals and even to
the gods – for anyone to over-value their own position in the world and to be hold an
unreasonable degree of pride as a result of this misguided perception.150 To observe this in
action, we need only look forward to the point at which the invasion force has been
assembled and is beginning its march against Greece: here, the narrator is careful to
describe the size of the army with mathematical precision, calculating that it includes
1,700,000 troops and 1,207 warships (7.60-99).151 Regardless of the fact that the exact
figures must surely be an exaggeration, it seems to me that the purpose here is to convey
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Cf. Kindt (2006), esp. pp. 39-43, and Shapiro (1996), esp. pp. 352-5.
Cf. Cairns (1996) pp. 6-10. I have already used this general concept when thinking the
fact that Herodotus often seems more concerned with showing what kind of person
someone is than with attributing a downfall to an individual deed.
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Cairns (1996) pp. 13-5. In a broader discussion, pp. 10-7, Cairns cites passages from
other authors in which “thinking big” is equivalent to a form of hubris.
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the scale of Xerxes’ arrogance through the enormity of his army; the king remarks to the
former Spartan ruler Demaratus that he feels no nation in the world would be capable of
resisting him (7.101). Accordingly, it becomes apparent that Herodotus wishes his reader
to interpret Xerxes as the natural extension of the same mistakes which have characterized
nearly every previous Persian king – he is not a new phenomenon, not totally unlike figures
such as Cyrus or Cambyses, only more extreme and shameless in his unjust greed and his
bloated sense of what is humanly possible. Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Pelling, there
is a “gathering clarity” which seems to come together in Xerxes’ blatantly hubristic speech,
giving the sense that everything about to occur has occurred before and can be explained
and understood using concepts and words which are already familiar.152

DID XERXES CHOOSE AT ALL? DEEPER FLAWS OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

Following the speech in which he announces his decision to invade, Xerxes
continues along the path of replicating the mistakes of his predecessors by rejecting the
sound advice of a “warner” figure. Speaking before the assembly of Persian nobles, his
uncle Artabanus reiterates many of the same themes which have been offered up by
advisors all the way back to the programmatic wisdom set out by Solon who, speaking as
the alter ego of the historian, urged Croesus to acknowledge the limited nature of human
existence and the relative weakness of his own power in the scope of the universe.153
Without belaboring the details, Artabanus’ message can best be taken as a response to the
arrogance and overconfidence expressed by the king: he reminds Xerxes that he had also
152

Pelling (2019) p. 120.
For Solon as expressing the views of Herodotus himself, cf. the discussion in my chapter
on the Croesus logos, incl. nn. 19-21, where I largely follow the position put forth by
Shapiro (1996).
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opposed the Scythian expedition and how that campaign had very nearly led to catastrophe
despite the Scythians being far weaker than the Greeks (7.10a-10c); he points out that one
can never fully account for the role of fortune in shaping human events (7.10d); and, most
significantly, he emphasizes that “the god loves to cut short everything which is excessive”
(7.10e: φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν.). This final point serves to
foreshadow the active part which will be played by the divine in bringing down the Persian
army,154 but the idea of Xerxes’ plans and his force as “excessive” (7.10e: ὑπερέχοντα) is
further confirmation of what we have already seen about the problem of the king “thinking
big” and failing to realize any limits whatsoever on his expansive goals for power.155
Unsurprisingly, Xerxes turns away the recommendations of his uncle, with the extent of
his inability to understand the real world being underscored through his irrational fear that
the Athenians might attempt to invade and conquer the Persian empire (7.11).156 With all
of these things said, however, the narrative then takes a somewhat unusual turn, as we
discover that Xerxes begins to rethink his ambitions, only to experience a dream urging
him to go ahead with an invasion of Greece. This dream, with its message about staying
true to course, becomes important for making sense of the extent to which the collapse of
Xerxes’ invasion can be explained in terms of the king’s transgressions versus an opposing
view which might suggest an inevitability to the events which occur.
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The role of the divine in defeating the invasion is discussed in my concluding chapter.
Cf. Shapiro (1996) p. 355, where she observes that “Herodotus believed that the gods
did not look favorably upon the great size of Xerxes’ army or on the great pride with which
he led it.”
156
Note that this idea of launching an unjustified invasion as a pre-emptive action is not
entirely unprecedented – we should recall that Croesus wanted to attack Persia in order to
protect himself from its growing power (1.46).
155

91
To begin, it is worth noting that we have already encountered the concept of dreams
as a signal for future events which are often misinterpreted or reveal information only when
it is already too late. I have previously considered how the dream of Croesus predicted that
his son would die to a wound from an iron weapon (1.34) or how the dream of Cyrus
forecasted that Darius would be the first ruler to threaten both Europe and Asia (1.209);
and there are many others besides in the Histories.157 In each case, the purpose of the dream
is analogous to that of an oracle or – to a lesser extent – of a “warner” character; that is, all
of these devices provide the historical actors with access, however fleeting, to a sort of
truth that is otherwise inaccessible to human beings.158 Returning to Xerxes and his plan to
invade Greece, Herodotus informs us that events transpire as follows: after giving further
thought to Artabanus’ speech, the king appears to change his mind but is visited in his sleep
by an apparition which urges him to go ahead with the campaign and warns of misfortune
if he chooses to ignore it (7.12-4); later, although Artabanus sounds another message of
caution about the dangers of allowing oneself to be led into risky endeavors by those who
are keen to use flattery and even tries to rationalize away the divine origin of the dream
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I have hinted at a few of these dreams in n. 30 above. In those examples, Cambyses
recognizes too late that a vision of Smerdis upon the throne referred to the Magi and not
his murdered brother (3.64), while the exiled Athenian tyrant Hippias has a revelation
before the battle of Marathon that he would never recover his former power (6.107).
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Herodotus’ belief in the validity of oracles is clear, as he writes that “I cannot claim
against oracles that they are untrue” (8.77.1: χρησμοῖσι δὲ οὐκ ἔχο ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐκ
εἰσὶ ἀληθέες). For dreams, consider that Croesus’ dream about his son is introduced in the
context of “retribution from the god” (1.34.1: ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις); Pelling (2019) p. 154 also
notes that “not all dreams are heaven-sent, but ones that make it into Herodotus’ narrative
… do tend to come from the gods and are there because they come true.” While “warners”
do not fit perfectly into this pattern because they are only human, Kindt (2006) pp. 41-6
explains that Croesus takes on an oracle-like role; though cf. n. 82 above on the debate
about whether he truly learns.
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(7.16),159 he too eventually experiences the same vision and is ominously told that “neither
in the future nor in the present moment will you be unharmed if you turn away that which
must occur” (7.17.2: ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐς τὸ μετέπειτα οὔτε ἐς τὸ παραυτίκα νῦν
καταπροΐξεαι ἀποτρέπων τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι); at this point, the two men agree that they
have no choice but to accept the dream as a message from the gods and carry on with the
invasion (7.18). Hence, this event seems to give divine sanction to Xerxes’ imperial
mission and must be reckoned with in relation to the condemnation of aggressive
expansionism throughout the Histories.
To shed light on this conundrum, it may be helpful to think once again about the
role of nomos as a guide for individual and national behavior and thus to ask the question
of whether imperialism should be seen as an essential characteristic of the Persian empire.
In a short but very compelling article, Evans considers the apparition’s statement that the
attack on Greece “must occur” (7.17.2: τὸ χρεὸν γενέσθαι) in parallel with Xerxes’
original claims to the Persian assembly that he is “following the very [custom] that I
inherited” (7.8a.1: παραδεξάμενος τε αὐτῷ χρήσομαι) and that “the god guides thusly”
(7.8a.1: θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει). Evans’ conclusion is that the mysterious figure’s message
should be interpreted as a warning to the king that he must not defy tradition by failing to
attempt further military expansion; however, he also rejects the position put forth by earlier
scholars that the dream somehow reflects the unavoidable or inevitable nature of Xerxes’
downfall, an argument that will become important shortly.160 Now, we have already seen
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For the problems of being convinced, recall how Atys talked his way into the hunting
expedition on which he ultimately died and fulfilled the prophecy of his father’s dream
(1.39-45); cf. also n. 86 above on the topic of “yes-men” surrounding the Persian kings.
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Evans (1961) pp. 109-10 with references to earlier literature.
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from the stories of Anacharsis and Scylas, the Scythians who were killed for adopting
foreign practices (4.76-80), that Herodotus presents custom as exerting a certain moral
imperative. More directly related to the issue at hand, it should be recalled that Atossa’s
exhortation for Darius to make war was centered around the value of constant imperial
activity as a core element of Persian greatness, as she cited the need for her husband to
“seem to be achieving something” (3.134.2: φαίνεσθαί τι ἀποδεικνύμενον); indeed, this
closely resembles Xerxes’ own stated desire to live up to the deeds of his ancestors (7.8a).
Therefore, it becomes clear the constant drive for expansion had become an essential
feature of Persian policy long before the invasion of Greece was even contemplated. As
Balot usefully explains, this norm of unrestrained imperialism may be interpreted as “the
product of individual choices at specific times in history, which shape the self-image and
identity of later individuals within the same culture.”161 In the case of Persia, it is apparent
that these initial choices were those of Cyrus, whom we have seen already to have set his
nation on a path toward unrelenting conquest after his remarkable victories against the
Medes, Babylonians, and Lydians.
One clear expression of this seemingly essential Persian characteristic can be found
in their perception of the “freedom” given to them by Cyrus. On the Persian account,
freedom is a binary status – to be free is to rule others, while to not be free is to be ruled
over – and thus there is a constant imperative to exercise this freedom through imperialistic
ventures.162 By contrast, Herodotus seems to favor a version of freedom which simply
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Balot (2001) p. 101.
This account is largely derived from the comments of Avery (1972) pp. 531-3, esp. n.
10. A question which may be worth considering is whether this freedom is meant to apply
to all Persians collectively or merely to the Persian rulers and elites. Cairns (1996) p. 15
remarks that “there is no warrant for distinguishing Persian hybris [i.e., expansionism; i.e.,
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means being left alone, a view not unlike that expressed by Tomyris when she urged Cyrus
to “rule your own people” (1.206.1: βασίλευε τῶν σεωυτοῦ) or by Otanes when he agreed
not to compete with Darius for the kingship in exchange for never having to obey any
commands apart from what is customary in Persia (3.83). Accordingly, it is clear how one
might make the case that Xerxes, compelled by his apparition to obey the course set out
for him by his predecessors, should not be interpreted as responsible for the outcome of his
own decisions. Yet, such a perspective would be mistaken, for it requires abandoning
several principles of the Herodotean worldview which have proven to be useful in
analyzing the fates of previous hubristic rulers.
Despite the temptation to view the events leading up to the invasion of Greece
through a sort of deterministic lens, there are several reasons why this view is problematic
and contradictory to overall trends throughout the Histories. Firstly, there is the simple fact
that we have already seen evidence that not every transgression leads equally to the same
form of catastrophe or retribution; I have discussed this idea at length in my chapters on
the Cyrus and Darius logoi, where I emphasized that not every military campaign is certain
to lead to failure despite having some of the characteristics of hubristic expansionism.
Instead, the model of explicability without predictability requires the audience to look more
closely at what sort of person a king happens to be, determining whether he really does

the exercise of their freedom] as an abstract national characteristic from the hybris of those
who formulate and carry out Persian policy. However, there is some reason for thinking
that Herodotus considers ordinary Persians to be unfree; this may be implied, for instance,
when Xerxes tells Demaratus that Greek soldiers surely will not fight because they are “all
equally free and not ruled over by one person” (7.103.3: ἐόντες γε ἐλεύθεροι πάντες
ὁμοίως καὶ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι).
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exhibit an inability to respect the nature of the world and the limits of his authority.163 To
be sure, each of the four rulers whose reigns have been covered thus far – that is, Croesus
up through Darius – exuded an overall sense of arrogance and excessive pride, but the
particulars of their character and actions have all led to somewhat different fates,
contradicting the idea that Herodotus’ world is one of simple repetitive patterns of give and
take which are unrelated to one’s deeds or frame of mind.164 Moreover, even if we were to
restrict our focus only to Xerxes himself and not give any weight to the accounts of
previous rulers or historical actors, it is nonetheless apparent that he does ultimately choose
his course of action when he alternates between a passionate desire to invade (7.8), a
reluctance to do so (7.12-14), and a final acceptance that he was guided by expectation to
press ahead (7.18). As noted above, it may very well be that Xerxes’ final decision is an
act of obedience to Persia nomos;165 however, the fact that the king ever contemplated not
pursuing aggressive expansion is significant in its own right, for this indicates that such
traditions are not fixed elements of an unchanging order but rather reflect the conscious
will of those who continue to uphold them and carry out their dictates. To quote Evans
again, “in a way the dream told him the truth. For an imperialist empire like Persia …
abandoning the Greek campaign and, with it, the policy of the Persian monarchy was
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Cf. n. 129 above for factors which may explain the lack of catastrophic failure in an
otherwise hubristic undertaking.
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On different characteristics of the various kings, cf. Marincola (2006) pp. 44-6. For the
view that history is governed by pure give and take without regard for moralistic factors,
cf. Immerwahr (1966) conclusion, esp. pp. 307-8. Lateiner (1989), though he occasionally
endorses a more mechanistic view of the Histories than what I am inclined to follow,
strongly refutes a deterministic interpretation at p. 197, noting that “Herodotus certainly
did believe in moral choices, not in external determinism or fatalism. When someone
topples, the reader is told that he had to, not because he was fated to fall … but because
being who he was … he had to err as he did.”
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Cf. n. 160 above.
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perhaps more dangerous than fighting and being defeated.”166 So it is in this context that
king Xerxes, even if somewhat removed from his initial wholehearted endorsement of
aggressive imperialism, sets out of the greatest act of hubris yet.

XERXES’ KRISIS MOMENT AND OTHER TRANSGRESSIONS

Until now, we have seen that Xerxes’ character in the period leading up to the
invasion of Greece is in some ways an embodiment of all of the flaws and failings which
have been present in earlier rulers, representing the very worst of the Persian empire and
its tendency to pursue the unrelenting drive for unjust conflict and conquest. He is like
Croesus in his constant desire to interpret the world in the most favorable possible light
and to believe that he can fully understand the will of the divine; he is like Cyrus in his
inability to see the proper bounds of his power and ambition; and we shall see that he is
like Cambyses in his disrespect for what is sacred and customary. But, Darius logos has
demonstrated, it is necessary to follow Solonian wisdom and “look to the end” in order to
see if the events of Xerxes’ reign are carried out in the same spirit of hubris in which they
began.
Moving forward in the narrative, the moment of no return for Xerxes – his krisis
moment, to use a term I have favored throughout this thesis – occurs as he leads his army
across the Hellespont, thus formally leaving Asia and entering into Europe. The moment
of the crossing itself (7.55) is not particularly eventful, though Herodotus does go into great
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Evans (1961) p. 111. A similar sentiment is expressed in Atossa’s speech to Darius
(3.134) when she notes that a large campaign would be useful to reduce the chance of a
rebellion against the king; ironically, of course, we have seen that the opposite tends to be
true, as revolts often occur in the wake of military operations.
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detail to recount the method of constructing the bridge (7.36).167 Of course, there is a certain
degree to which this kind of detail is thematically significant, since the vast scale of the
undertaking – aside from simply being a “marvel” (cf. 1.proem: ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ
θωμαστά) – reinforces the gravity of the transgression it aims to bring about; that is to say,
it is no coincidence that the most blatant and shameless act of Persian arrogance occurs not
along the banks of some river separating two nations but rather at the straits which mark
out the separation of the continents.168 With this said, Xerxes’ behavior prior to the literal
boundary crossing is equally revealing of the ways in which he is ignorant or indifferent
toward his natural human limits. To give only a few examples: he once again allows himself
to be convinced of an extremely beneficial understanding of omens according to which the
future will be shaped in accordance with his most ambitious goals (7.19); he at one point
seems not to acknowledge his own mortality (7.44-7);169 and he rejects Artabanus’ final
piece advice about the dangers of unpredictability (7.48-52).
However, by far the most meaningful of Xerxes’ wrongdoings on his march to
Greece, and the one which most clearly exhibits his utter disrespect not only for nature but
even for his own ancestral customs, is the king’s response to the fact that the first bridge
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On the symbolic importance of lingering on the construction of the bridges, cf. the
discussion in my chapter on the Darius logos on the accounts of the bridge across the
Bosporus built by Mandrocles (4.87-8) or of Croesus’ bridge over the river Halys by Thales
(1.75). Also notable in the case of Xerxes’ bridge is the fact that it is built by Egyptian and
Phoenician engineers; the involvement of two separate cultures may be taken as a subtle
reference to the fact that Persian imperialism involves – by its very nature – a kind of
unnatural bringing together of different peoples; cf. n. 76 above for Lateiner’s (1989) view
on the importance of separation in the Histories.
168
For Herodotus’ interest in the continental division, cf. the discussion about the crossing
into Europe to attack the Scythians in my chapter on the Darius logos.
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This moment, which I have hinted at previously – cf. n. 60 above – is analyzed by Turpin
(2014).
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over the Hellespont had been destroyed in a storm (7.34). Herodotus describes the situation
as follows:
“When Xerxes learned this [i.e., that the previous bridge was destroyed], he
ordered that three hundred lashes from a whip strike the Hellespont and that
a pair of bonds be dropped down into the sea. … And he certainly
commanded them to say these barbarous and arrogant things while they
were striking: ‘O harsh water, your master gives you this punishment, since
you were unjust to him who did you no harm. But king Xerxes will cross
you whether you wish for him to or not.’”
ὡς δ᾽ ἐπύθετο Ξέρξης, δεινὰ ποιεύμενος τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐκέλευσε
τριηκοσίας ἐπικέσθαι μάστιγι πληγὰς καὶ κατεῖναι ἐς τὸ πέλαγος
πεδέων ζεῦγος. … ἐνετέλλετο δὲ ὦν ῥαπίζοντας λέγειν βάρβαρά τε
καὶ ἀτάσθαλα: ὦν πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίκην ἐπιτιθεῖ τήνδε,
ὅτι μιν ἠδίκησας οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἄδικον παθόν. (7.35.1-2)
Several points should stand out immediately from this account. First, there is the abuse of
the physical world, a theme which has occurred previously on a much smaller scale in
events such as the Cnidians’ attempt to turn their isthmus into an island (1.174) or Cyrus’
diversion of the river Gyndes in response to his anger at the drowning of a horse (1.189).
More obviously, we should consider the fact that the passage above is unusual in that
Herodotus seems to provide a direct moral comment on Xerxes’ actions, noting that the
speech he ordered to be given was “barbarous and arrogant (7.35.2: βάρβαρά τε καὶ
ἀτάσθαλα); this is unusual, since we have seen that Herodotus prefers to rely upon implied
judgments driven home through repetition. Perhaps most surprisingly, however, given
what we have seen of Xerxes’ interest in living up to the expectations set by his ancestors,
is that his actions are in fact contradictory to Persian nomos. Early in the Histories, we
learn that “they [i.e., Persians] neither urinate nor spit into a river, nor wash their hands in
them, nor tolerate anyone else to do this; rather, they greatly worship rivers” (1.138.2: ἐς
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ποταμὸν δὲ οὔτε ἐνουρέουσι οὔτε ἐμπτύουσι, οὐ χεῖρας ἐναπονίζονται, οὐδὲ ἄλλον
οὐδένα περιορῶσι, ἀλλὰ σέβονται ποταμοὺς μάλιστα). Now, although it is true that
the Hellespont is not a river per se, we have seen that it operates symbolically as the
ultimate case of the river-crossing theme; thus, Xerxes’ actions here – namely, treating the
waters with such flagrant disrespect – indicates that he is unable to constrain his passions
even when they drive him to contravene his own national customs. Notably, this incident
is not an aberration for Xerxes, as we see later in the invasion that he orders the body of
Leonidas to be mutilated, even when doing so is atypical for the way that Persians usually
treat the corpses of their enemies (7.238).
At this point, therefore, in light of everything which we have seen, it is not
unreasonable that Xerxes’ invasion of Greece – both in its motivation and its actual conduct
– represents an attempt to ignore or overcome virtually every form of human limitation; in
seeking out his ambitions with virtually boundless confidence and pride, he seems to think
himself immune to the forces which have restrained his predecessors. As a consequence, it
should be no surprise that Herodotus presents his downfall as thorough and
uncompromising, leaving him ruined in proportion to the excessive scale of his hubris. The
circumstances of the king’s defeat itself, together with the lessons which can be taken from
the fate of Xerxes and Persian imperialism more generally, are the topic of my final chapter.
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CONCLUSION: XERXES’ DEFEAT, HUMAN LIMITS RE-AFFIRMED, AND
LESSONS LEARNED FOR PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Having covered the essential features from the reigns of five separate rulers – the
characteristics of each king himself, how they all were misled by an inflated sense of selfworth to perceive themselves unrestrained by the factors in the world which otherwise
function to check human ambition, and how their fates may be made intelligible
retrospectively through the choice to act upon unjust passions – I at last turn to the
resolution of the Histories as a whole with the humiliation of the great antagonist Xerxes.
In this final chapter, I begin from the collapse of the Persian invasion of Greece and proceed
to draw conclusions about the failure of imperialism and hubris more generally. In doing
so, I shall also take the opportunity to discuss an aspect of Herodotus’ work and his
worldview which has until now gone unexamined or, at the very least, has been treated
only in passing – that is, the role played by the divine in shaping and in making sense of
historical events. Ultimately, I aim to answer the question of what positive moral lessons
Herodotus seems to intend for his reader to take away from the Histories and to discuss
what meaning these might hold both for a contemporary audience in the mid-to-late fifth
century B.C.E. and for a modern audience as well.
The defeat of the Greek invasion and the downfall of Xerxes is quite different from
the failures of previous rulers and poses certain challenges for interpretation. At a
superficial level, one might even be tempted to believe that Xerxes follows in the
metaphorical footsteps of his father Darius by exhibiting good sense when he returns to
Persia after the disastrous naval battle at Salamis (8.113-20). While it is true in the short
term that he manages to save his own life by escaping from Greece – thus avoiding the fate
which befalls his second-in-command Mardonius, who is slain by the Spartans at the battle
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of Plataea (9.64) – it would be incorrect to take this as a sign that the king has recognized
the limits of his power and the misguided spirit of arrogance in which the invasion was
originally launched. If we consider the rationale for Xerxes’ decision to pursue this course
of action, it is apparent that his mindset remains largely unchanged from the beginning of
the campaign, as he remains concerned with protecting his own safety and reputation from
the consequences of failure. Specifically, Herodotus informs us that he “was delighted at
the advice” (8.103: ἥσθη τε δὴ τῇ συμβουλίῃ Ξέρξης) given by his admiral Artemisia,
since “she had struck upon the things that he himself was thinking” (8.103: ἐπετύγχανε
τά περ αὐτὸς ἐνόεε) with her speech encouraging that Xerxes personally retreat but leave
a smaller force behind in Greece, allowing him to either take credit for a victory achieved
by his subordinates or to suffer comparatively little from a loss (8.102). Though
Artemisia’s speech does at least acknowledge the chance of defeat rather than pretending
that success is the only possibility,170 it is notable that Xerxes once again follows the pattern
of only accepting advice which reinforces his pre-existing beliefs. Furthermore, even if we
were to concede the soundness of this wisdom for saving Xerxes and a portion of his army
from immediate destruction, it reeks of arrogance and excessive pride by attributing all of
the successes of the Persian empire to the king himself while shielding him from any
responsibility for mistakes and setbacks; accordingly, this logic is entirely incapable of
explaining away the much broader disasters attributed by Herodotus to Xerxes’ reign.
Just as we saw in the previous chapter that Xerxes was the most blatant and
aggressive violator of human limits to appear the Histories, a holistic view of his kingship
should leave us with the conclusion that he suffers the most thorough downfall, being left
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embarrassed and defeated by every norm and boundary which he sought to bypass or
eliminate. To borrow Marincola’s assessment, in which he contrasts the Xerxes of
Herodotus with the character of the same name in Aeschylus’ Persians, “Aeschylus had
shown a man soundly defeated on the political front, but Herodotus shows him destroyed
in all ways.”171 To understand the full extent of Xerxes’ downfall, it is necessary to follow
Solonian wisdom and “look to the end,” accounting for the turmoil in his own household
in addition to his military debacles to conclude that he “ended badly.”172 Beginning from
the most obvious point, it is important to emphasize that Xerxes is the first – and the only
– Persian leader presented in the Histories to leave the empire weaker and smaller than
when he inherited it. Not only is his fleet shattered at Salamis (8.89-97) and the army routed
and very nearly cut down to the man at Plataea (9.69-70), but he in fact loses territory
which had already been under Persian control: in the aftermath of a battle fought at Mycale
near Samos, Herodotus reports that “Ionia rebelled from the Persians for a second time”
(9.104: οὕτω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον Ἰωνίη ἀπὸ Περσέων ἀπέστη), while the Athenians go on
to attack the Persian-dominated cities along the Hellespont (9.114-21). In this way, Xerxes’
eagerness to live up to the accomplishments of his ancestors results in just the opposite, for
he both fails to add any new territories to their conquests and also squanders portions of
their empire in the process.
Moreover, we see near the very end of the Histories – in one of the very last stories
of the work – that Xerxes is responsible for creating a great scandal at the Persian court
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chapter on the Croesus logos, but cf. Shapiro (1996) pp. 357-62 for a summary and
examples of what it means to Herodotus for someone to “end well” or “end badly.”
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when he is unable to control his sexual desires and is driven by his lust for his own brother’s
wife, and subsequently for her daughter as well, to arrange a series of unusual intra-familial
marriages; in the process, his behavior is uncovered by certain members of the royal family,
leading to the death of the brother and the mutilation of his wife (9.108-13). This moment,
though not as significant in a purely “historical” sense as the failure of the Greek
expedition, serves to illustrate the extent to which Xerxes has lost the ability to restrain
himself and act in accordance with basic ideas of decency and propriety despite being
explicitly warned of his wrongdoing (9.111).173 In other words, we see that even in defeat,
even when Xerxes has already been faced with plain evidence that the world does not
respond blindly to his own interests and ambitions, he retains an overweening sense of
pride and utter disregard for others.
The final proof that Xerxes “ended badly” is one not discussed by the narrator
himself, but one that must surely have been known to any contemporary audience of the
Histories – I mean, of course, the fact that Xerxes would go on to be assassinated and
overthrown in the years following the events of his war against the Greeks.174 By having
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These events bear resemblance to the misdeeds of Cambyses when marrying his sister
and killing his brother (3.30-2), events which Herodotus uses as proof of his madness.
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above.
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this knowledge, the reader is in a privileged position to understand the great king’s
ignominious demise later in life as a consequence for the transgressions which he seemed
to escape earlier, a situation not so dissimilar from Hooker’s observation about the story of
Arion and the dolphin that wrongdoings “were bound to come to light … even at a remote
date and in an unexpected manner.”175 Events such as these might be taken to imply that
there is a form of justice – a moral order, so to speak – at play in the world, such that even
when an apparent transgression is not immediately followed up by its punishment, the fact
that it does come eventually allows the reader to understand that wrongs will be righted,
often under surprising circumstances which could never have been anticipated by the
transgressor himself. In this way, we see yet another example of explicability without
predictability at work in the defeat and downfall of Xerxes, though one in which the gap in
knowledge between the historical actors and the audience is amplified greatly by the latter’s
pre-existing awareness of the outcome and, just as importantly, by the large-scale
involvement of divine forces in shaping the course of events.
Up to this point, we have – rightly, I would suggest – focused on explaining the
significance of events in the Histories from the standpoint of human actions, motivations,
and characteristics;176 for example, I have repeatedly suggested that Herodotus is often
interested in showing what kind of person a ruler happened to be and allowing the reader
to see his poor decisions as the product of a hubristic mindset. This is not to say that I have
entirely neglected the divine, for there have been certain events – coincidences too strange
for rational explanation such as dreams which prove true, Croesus’ miraculous salvation
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from death, or Cambyses being injured on the same part of the body where he wounded
the Apis bull – which, to use Pelling’s phrase, “[draw] the audience irresistibly into
accepting a divine dimension.”177 However, the narrative of Xerxes and the catastrophe of
his Greek invasion is particularly rich with these moments and is infused with a general
sense of divine activity from its very outset. To give only a few examples: the first bridge
over the Hellespont is destroyed in a powerful storm (7.34); another storm destroys a large
portion of the Persian fleet just before the battle at Artemisium, prompting Herodotus to
observe that “this was all done by the god so that he might make the Persian [force] equal
to the Geeek” (8.13: ἐποιέετό τε πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ
τὸ Περσικὸν); and a Persian detachment attempting to capture the oracle at Delphi is
repelled by a sudden avalanche on Mount Parnassus and by two larger-than-life figures
fighting on the side of the Greeks (8.37-9). In other words, there is ample reason to believe
that the gods looked unfavorably upon the Persian invasion and were actively attempting
to prevent its success, but what are we to make of this fact?
In the context of explaining hubris and the injustice of excessive greed, I have
already made reference to the notion that the gods tend to become envious of any human
activity which would interfere with their usual purview of dispensing good and bad fortune
or of exacting harsh forms of retribution;178 likewise, we have also seen that “thinking big”
is a sort of transgression in its own right capable of drawing the ire of the divine.179 Now,
keeping these things in mind and also remembering that Xerxes sought to transgress against
virtually every limit previously encountered in the Histories, I contend that his downfall
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should be interpreted as a final re-affirmation of the relative weakness of humankind amidst
the broader realities of the world. That is to say, we see in retrospect that Xerxes’ invasion
is so outrageous that the gods themselves act against it; in doing so, they take on the the
role of what Immerwahr calls “guarantors of the workings of nature.”180 However, while
Immerwahr largely denies the moralistic significance of such an idea, instead situating it
as just one portion of a “world order” which is merely “existential,”181 I much prefer to
believe that Herodotus has told these events as he has because there is some meaning in
the course of history. A glimpse of this perspective comes through when Themistocles,
addressing the victorious Greeks after the battle of Salamis, seems almost to rebut the
hubris expressed by Xerxes at the beginning of the war:
“It was not we who achieved these things, but rather the gods and the heroes,
who resented that one man – unholy and arrogant – should rule both Asia
and Europe too: he who dealt equally with both temples and homes, burning
and destroying the statues of the gods; he who whipped and threw fetters
into the sea.”
τάδε γὰρ οὐκ ἡμεῖς κατεργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ
ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆσ τε Ἀσίης καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι
ἐόντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον: ὃς τά τε ἱρὰ καὶ ἴδια ἐν ὁμοίῳ
ἐποιέετο, ἐμπιπράς τε καὶ καταβάλλων τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα: ὃς καὶ
τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπεμαστίγωσε πέδας τε κατῆκε. (8.109.3)
From this passage, we get a clear sense that the divine retribution at play here is moralizing
in nature, that it is meant to teach a lesson – if not to Xerxes, who is so blinded by his pride
as to be beyond the point of redemption, at least to the audience of the Histories – about
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what happens to those who should have known better about challenging the basic features
of human existence in pursuit of unchecked ambitions.182 And again, if we recall the
principle of “explicable but not predictable” which I have mentioned so often throughout
this thesis, what else could at once be so unpredictable but also carry so much explanatory
power as the direct intervention of the gods into human affairs? So, while no one could
have known at the outset that divine action would play such a great role in the salvation of
Greece, Herodotus sees in the outcome of the war a broader symbol for the fate of
humankind.
To try bringing this very lengthy discussion of the moralistic symbols and themes
within the Histories to something resembling a conclusion, I propose to answer a fairly
simple question: what exactly is the lesson that Herodotus wishes his audience to take away
from the work? Or, to put it in a slightly different way, what is the purpose of his “display
of research” (1.proem: ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις)? At a certain level, we can see that his goal
must simply have been to learn as much as possible about the world and to report his
observations to an audience that he believed would find them helpful, bizarre, or merely
fascinating – this “curiosity factor,” so to speak, is probably much of the reason why the
Histories retain their appeal even in the modern world, as we are no less susceptible to be
charmed by tales of natural wonders, exotic customs, and deeds of heroism than any ancient
Greek. But this answer is not altogether satisfactory, since it is not able to fully explain or
take into account the fact that so many of Herodotus’ stories seem to play out along the
same lines: Croesus and Polycrates were both wealthy men whose riches could not save
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them from eventual disaster; Cambyses and the Spartan king Cleomenes both went mad
after committing acts of sacrilege; and any number of individuals discovered that greed
and deception tend not to pay off.
This is where the moral element comes into play, permitting the reader to gain some
understanding of the world and how it functions – an understanding which Herodotus
himself seems to have developed in the course of his travels, observations, and inquiries
into the past. To this end, Graham, writing about the Ionian scientists and philosophers in
whose intellectual footsteps Herodotus may have followed, observes that “investigation …
could fruitfully be turned toward important issues, even toward the self, and it could
uncover true relationships … it could also reveal the structure of the world and its principles
of operation.”183 Now to be clear, as I have noted previously, I do not claim that Herodotus
moralizes in the sense that he offers specific guidance about how one must act in any given
situation, as this would imply a certainty to events which has proven faulty throughout this
analysis. Rather, to repeat the very useful quotation from Hau which set out the nature of
Herodotean moralizing in my introduction, he “tries to endow [his] reader with the mindset necessary in order to cope with [life].”184 While there is no place in the Histories where
Herodotus’ entire worldview is condensed into a single statement, from everything that we
have seen, such a statement might be something like this:
“One must recognize that life can be unpredictable and that there are many
things in the world which are beyond human power and even human
understanding. Because of this, one should restrain oneself, not being overly
desirous or meddling in other people’s affairs, since it is impossible to know
in advance whether any particular transgression might invoke the jealousy
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of the gods or otherwise push beyond the boundaries of proper human
behavior.”
That this message sounds remarkably similar to the advice given to Croesus by Solon
should come as no surprise, given it was that speech which introduced the importance of
“looking to the end” and realizing that so much of human existence is a matter of dealing
with uncertainty while being guided only by general principles of justice and the
knowledge of how past events have turned out.
Having said all of these things, there is one final question which surely must be
addressed: why does any of this matter? For an audience in Herodotus’ own time, when
the two major powers of the Greek world – Athens and Sparta, the very states which had
contributed most to the defeat of Persia just a generation or two earlier – were at each
other’s throats, his message about the dangers of imperialism and the problem of greed
might have seemed very timely indeed.185 Moreover, since we have seen that Herodotus
attempts to connect the fate of individuals to that of whole communities on the basis of
analogy and consistent principles at play in the world,186 there is also a message for the
ordinary person to not carry himself with excessive pride, to accept that good fortune is
not eternal, and to act modestly in dealing with others and with the divine. But what of the
modern day? Why should any of us who live in the twenty-first century care whatsoever
about the wisdom of Herodotus? After all, we live in an era when most people are likely
not concerned that their hubris will attract the retribution of the gods and when the marvels
of science have given us much greater confidence in our understanding of the nature of

185

The view that Herodotus refers to and criticizes Athenian imperialism is laid out in detail
by Balot (2001) pp. 114-29.
186
Cf. nn. 50-1 above.
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the world. I do not deny the truth in these things, but there is perhaps still value in the
Herodotean virtues of acknowledging uncertainty and the limited nature of human
ambitions. Consider this: at the time that I am writing this thesis in the spring of 2022, we
are currently witnessing the beginning of an imperialistic war between Russia and its
neighbor Ukraine, a conflict which was sparked by an arrogant – dare I say hubristic? –
set of demands from Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. It is too early to know how this
invasion will ultimately turn out, but if somehow Putin goes on to be defeated by his much
weaker enemy, we would not be entirely wrong to explain the outcome by saying that
perhaps this war pushed too far and tried too hard to upend the order of the world, failing
according to the very same moral principles as the bridging of the Hellespont by king
Xerxes.
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